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I. Introduction
Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)' provide
the rule on jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, its political
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities for criminal
prosecutions or for civil suits based upon actions that might be
deemed criminal in nature?2 A 2002 report by an American Bar
t All views expressed herein and any errors are those of the Author. I would like to
thank Frances Foster for mentoring me in the publication of this article. I would also
like to thank the Editorial Staff of the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation for their superb editorial assistance.
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
2 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006) (setting forth the entities associated with
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Association (ABA) working group noted that cases dealing with
these questions have emerged and that these issues have "not
insignificant policy implications."' Furthermore, because it has
become clear that entities can commit a number of serious crimes,
it would seem that there is a considerable amount at stake here.4
May a corporation, the majority of the shares of which are held by
a foreign state, be immune from criminal liability for financial or
environmental crimes?' Can branches of foreign central banks
flout our criminal laws? If the FSIA does not answer these
questions, how should one design policy and law that will?
Asking these questions seems particularly pertinent now,
because of recent developments related to the scope of the FSIA
and transnational litigation in U.S. courts generally. The Supreme
Court has most recently resolved the question of whether the FSIA
covers foreign officials, answering in the negative and chipping
away at the inclusiveness that used to pervade interpretations of
the statute.6 In other words, the recent decision in Samantar v.
a foreign state that are covered by the FSIA).
3 Working Grp. of the Am. Bar Ass'n, Report: Reforming the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 40 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 489, 496 (2002).
4 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for
Corporate Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 129 passim (1984) (discussing various forms of direct
and vicarious liability for corporations); Kathleen F. Brickey, Death in the Workplace:
Corporate Liability for Criminal Homicide, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
753 passim (1987) (discussing officer and corporate liability); Nicholas Freitag, Federal
Food and Drug Act Violations, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 647, 648-49 (2004) (discussing the
same); Neal Shover & Aaron S. Routhe, Environmental Crime, 32 CRIME & JUST. 321,
325-26 (2005) (reviewing individual and organizational environmental crime).
5 See generally Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 477 (2003) ("A
Corporation is an instrumentality of a foreign state under the FSIA only if the foreign
state itself owns a majority of the corporation's shares.").
6 See, e.g., Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 197
(2007) (reinforcing that the FSIA is the "sole basis" for obtaining jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691
(2004) (describing the FSIA as "a comprehensive statute containing a set of legal
standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)
("The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country.") (internal quotation marks
omitted); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 610 (1992) ("The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. § 1602 et seq.,
establishes a comprehensive framework for determining whether a court in this country,
state or federal, may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state . . . ."); Argentine Republic
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Yousufindicates that the text of the FSIA should not be read
creatively and that courts should be careful not to include juristic
persons or entities that do not find an express basis in the FSIA's
text.' Thus, former foreign officials must face the risk of civil
suits on the basis of conduct that is fairly uniformly acknowledged
to be illegal under international law, such as genocide, extra-
judicial killing, and torture.9
The Supreme Court may also soon decide whether private
corporations could face similar liability under statutes like the
Alien Tort Statute.'o In addition, in a recent high-profile case,
New York authorities showed the world that even the head of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a French presidential
hopeful, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, could be brought to trial for
serious criminal violations of local laws, when they charged him
with the alleged rape of an employee in the New York hotel where
he was staying." In these significant developments, individual
accountability-whether because an official or entity associated
v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) ("We think that the text and
structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress' intention that the FSIA be the sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts."); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank
of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (stating that the FSIA "contains a comprehensive
set of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a
foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities").
7 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
8 Id. at 2281, 2292-93.
9 John B. Bellinger III, The Dog that Caught the Car: Observations on the Past,
Present, and Future Approaches of the Office of the Legal Adviser to Official Acts
Immunities, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819, 833-35 (2011) (discussing the implications
for additional human rights litigation against officials for the violation ofjus cogens
fundamental norms).
10 Mike Sacks, Supreme Court to Rule on Corporate Personhood for Crimes
Against Humanity, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/10/17/supreme-court_n_1015953.html. Although the Kiobel decision
remains outstanding at the time of this article, the Court did decide the companion case,
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (holding that the Torture
Victim Protection Act only allows for damages against the torturer himself). See also
Warren Richley, Torture Victim's Family Can't Sue PLO for Damages, Supreme Court
Says, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2012/0418/Torture-victim-s-family-can-t-sue-
PLO-for-damages-Supreme-Court-says.
II See Clyde Haberman, In Messy Strauss-Kahn Case, A Glimpse of Working
Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2011), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/08/23/in-messy-strauss-kahn-case-a-glimpse-of-a-working-justice-system/.
452012]
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with the state has engaged in conduct that is so contrary to the
most basic and fundamental norms that it cannot be deemed
official or because the entity or individual is not engaged in
governmental or official conduct at all (i.e., private conduct)-
appears to have a slight edge over immunity. 2 What do these
developments mean, if anything, for the debate about the FSIA's
criminal jurisdiction?
While few and far between relative to other FSIA litigation,
cases directly or indirectly related to the FSIA's coverage of
criminal actions have arisen and continue to arise, primarily in the
lower courts.13 On some issues, a circuit split has developed, 4
which raises the possibility that the Supreme Court will address
the issue before Congress takes action. It took almost twenty
years before the circuit split over the FSIA's coverage of foreign
officials ripened and was finally resolved, however. The question
of criminal jurisdiction may approach that point as well.'
This Article examines the contours of the debate that has
arisen with regard to the FSIA's criminal jurisdiction in different
contexts and argues that, as questions are raised as to the coverage
of the FSIA in the courts, Congress should act to correct the
situation and clarify the FSIA's scope. It argues that the FSIA
does not cover criminal immunity, but that Congress should, on
the basis of international law's trajectory and related U.S.
jurisprudence and public policy, adopt a standard of restrictive
criminal foreign sovereign immunity in the future. This Article
also suggests specific issues Congress should consider when
amending the FSIA. In particular, Congress should take account
of the ongoing debate about foreign sovereign immunity that
12 See John Eligon, Lawyers Say Strauss-Kahn is Covered by Diplomatic
Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2011, at A19 (quoting victim's lawyers' response to
defense's motion to dismiss on grounds of immunity: "Strauss-Kahn's claim of
diplomatic immunity will clearly fail because: (1) he is not a diplomat; (2) according to
his own story, he was in New York on 'personal' business; (3) he, not the I.M.F., paid
for his room at the Sofitel; and (4) he was obviously acting in his personal capacity when
he violently attacked [the victim].").
13 See infra Parts III and IV.
I4 See infra Part II.
15 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283-84 n.4 (2010) (describing Courts of
Appeals cases beginning with Chuidian v. Philippine Nat. Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103
(9th Cir. 1990)).
46 [Vol. XXXVIII
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT
recent decisions have spawned both domestically and
internationally, keeping in mind that restrictive immunity is often
an uncomfortable but necessary compromise in both balancing
trends of individual accountability under international law'6 and
preserving foreign relations and the "dignity" of the state. 7
A brief note on definition and scope is appropriate here. As
used in this article, crimes could include domestic law crimes and
international law crimes, which should not imply that either of
these two categories is mutually exclusive. Crimes under
international law might include terrorism, genocide, torture, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.' These actions are
criminalized by international law (as crystallized by the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court) but may be civilly
actionable in some way under U.S. law, such as under the Alien
Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act.' 9 Furthermore,
similar actions, if committed inside the United States, would likely
be criminal in some form.20 However, this category of human
rights abuses is not excepted from the FSIA's blanket grant of
immunity, at least in the civil context.2 ' Thus, even if the FSIA
covers crimes, it is unlikely that any of its exceptions applies for
16 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 27, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (stating that actions committed in an
official capacity and immunities under municipal or international law shall not bar the
ICC from exercising jurisdiction over a matter).
17 See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1640 (2011)
("Denial of sovereign immunity, to be sure, offends the dignity of a State; but not every
offense to the dignity of a State constitutes a denial of sovereign immunity. The specific
indignity against which sovereign immunity protects is the insult to a State of being
haled into court without its consent.").
18 Rome Statute, supra note 16, arts. 5-9.
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
20 See Douglass Cassell, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes within
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 421, 428-30
(2000) (discussing what the author believes to be the present, but incomplete, portions of
U.S. criminal law that would make it possible to try crimes like genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes committed both inside and outside of the United States.); see
also Melina Milazzo, Time is Now to Clarify U.S. Criminal Jurisdiction over
Contractors, HUM. RTs. FIRST BLOG (May 24, 2011), http://www.humanrights
first. org/201 1/05/24/time-is-now-to-clarify-u-s-criminal-jurisdiction-over-contractors/
(discussing the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts over government contractors abroad).
21 See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 437-38
(1989) (noting that the FSIA can preclude jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute).
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such behavior, as courts have declared that the commission of
these acts may not be tantamount to a waiver of sovereign
immunity.22 That debate notwithstanding, this Article intends to
focus primarily on the former category-criminal behavior under
U.S. law for acts committed within U.S. borders-although there
may be implications for the latter category as a result of this
analysis.
This Article is divided into five additional sections. The first
section discusses the general bases for debate about the FSIA's
criminal jurisdiction and scholarly literature that has discussed the
question, whether directly or indirectly. The second section
discusses specific cases that have directly or indirectly touched
upon the FSIA's connection to criminal behavior. The third
section discusses how the case of Samantar can help resolve
questions related to the FSIA's criminal jurisdiction. The fourth
section discusses the primary considerations in designing a
possible amendment to the FSIA for purposes of criminal
jurisdiction, and identifies some issues and guidelines that
Congress should consider in drafting that amendment. The final
section, the conclusion, offers some additional support for such an
amendment and thoughts on its timing.
II. The Bases for the Circuit Split
By way of brief background, the FSIA, enacted in 1976, was
meant to codify international law on foreign sovereign immunity.23
It has become part of a line of similar statutes from common law
jurisdictions that put decisions about foreign sovereign immunity
in the hands of the judiciary, rather than the political organs of
government.24 Like other domestic statutes and multi-lateral level
treaties concerning foreign sovereign immunity, the FSIA is part
of a movement to codify a restrictive approach to foreign
22 See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239,
243-44 (2d Cir. 1996).
23 See Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 195, 199-
200 (2007) (noting that one of the FSIA's main objectives was the "codification of
international law at the time of.. . enactment").
24 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976) (noting that in enacting the FSIA, "U.S.
immunity practice would conform to the practice in virtually every other country
where sovereign immunity decisions are made exclusively by the courts and not by a
foreign affairs agency").
48 [Vol. XXXVIII
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sovereign immunity.25 The FSIA provides a broad grant of
immunity to foreign states, their political subdivisions, and their
agencies and instrumentalities-which includes majority state-
owned enterprises, but now excludes governmental officials.26
This broad grant of immunity is subject to exceptions, however,
primarily for the private and commercial conduct of states and
their instrumentalities, 27 as set forth in Sections 1605 and 1607 of
the FSIA.2 8 In this way, the FSIA encapsulates the restrictive
theory of foreign sovereign immunity.29
The broad grant of immunity in Section 1604 states:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act
a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.30
It makes no distinction between civil, criminal, or administrative
jurisdiction.3 1 However, as the remainder of this Article will
discuss, different interpretations amongst the courts about whether
the immunity granted in 1604 is for civil jurisdiction only exist
based on the exceptions to immunity in Sections 1605 and 1607,
the text of other provisions, and the legislative history of the
statute.3 2 The exceptions to immunity present in Sections 1605 to
1607 also do not distinguish between civil and criminal cases,
although they are arguably better suited for civil cases.3 3
No Supreme Court case has directly addressed the meaning of
the term "jurisdiction" in Section 1604. In a passing reference in
one case, the Supreme Court noted that the FSIA governs "civil"
25 See Robert B. Von Merhen, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 38-40 (1978).
26 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2291-92 (2010).
27 Von Merhen, supra note 25, at 40.
28 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (2006 & Supp. 2010). Provisions regarding the
attachment of property and the execution of judgment are contained in later sections.
See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609, 1611 (2012).
29 Von Merhen, supra note 25, at 37-38.
30 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
31 See id.
32 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2006).
33 See United States v. Hendron, 813 F. Supp. 973, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(conducting a provision by provision analysis).
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actions, but that the language was neither exclusive nor did it
relate to the holding of the case at hand.34 In that case, Verlinden
B. V. v. Central Bank ofNigeria,5 the Court specifically addressed
the FSIA's constitutionality with respect to its creation of federal
jurisdiction for cases that arguably arise under state law, but which
the Court concluded may be said to arise under federal law for
purposes of Article III of the Constitution. It is true, as other
courts have noted, that the Supreme Court characterized the FSIA
as a civil statute, but the Court went no further in explaining that
reference."
Commentary on the FSIA likewise provides no clear answer as
to the statute's connection with criminal jurisdiction. Some
commentators merely conclude that the FSIA is a civil statute
without detailed analysis." Others conclude that, at the very most,
Section 1604 exempts entities covered by the FSIA from criminal
jurisdiction. For example, in her book, The Law of State
Immunity, Hazel Fox notes that FSIA is in line with what she
characterizes as international law's prohibition on criminal
prosecutions of foreign states." She includes the FSIA with other
statues from common law countries, which "exclude[]" their
application to criminal proceedings.40 She also notes the pervasive
34 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,488-89 (1983).
35 Id
36 Id. at 488 (stating that the FSIA "contains a comprehensive set of legal
standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state or its
political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities").
37 Id. at 488-89.
38 See Spencer Weber Waller, Suing OPEC, 64 U. PiTT. L. REV. 105, 117 n.66
(2002) (observing that the FSIA covers criminal immunity and bars such suits); see also
Curtis A Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2148 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith,
Pinochet] (concluding that the FSIA only applies to grant immunity in civil cases);
Charles Pierson, Pinochet and the End of Immunity: England's House of Lords Holds
that a Former Head of State is Not Immune for Torture, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
263, 322 n.448 (2000) ("FSIA contains no criminal exclusion equivalent to State
Immunity Act 16(4). There is little authority on the issue of whether FSIA applies in
criminal prosecutions. . . . The best analysis is that both the State Immunity Act [of
Great Britain] and FSIA are commercial statutes unsuited to criminal prosecutions,
particularly for human rights violations.").
39 HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 503 (1st ed. 2002) [hereinafter Fox,
1st ed.].
40 Id
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silence of the FSIA as to criminal jurisdiction and highlights the
fact that it expressly confers jurisdiction on the federal courts for
civil actions.4 1 In addition, she notes that civil actions based on
criminal activity may be permitted under the FSIA in certain
circumstances, but dismissed where the conduct allegedly
commercial they are based upon reaches a certain level of
destructiveness.42
On the other hand, Joseph Dellapenna, in his treatise, Suing
Foreign Governments and Their Corporations, notes that no one
seems to have contemplated bringing a criminal prosecution
against a foreign state; that the FSIA's text and legislative history
are silent on the criminal question; and that courts that have
considered the issue have concluded that the FSIA does not
apply. 43 Professor Dellapenna also sets forth three reasons why
one might conclude the FSIA has no criminal dimension. The first
reason is the silence in the statute regarding criminal proceedings,
in comparison to the "detailed provisions" regarding civil
proceedings." Secondly, Dellapenna notes that the provision
creating original jurisdiction in the federal courts mentions "civil"
actions only.45 Thirdly, Dellapenna points out that the FSIA is
codified in the "civil procedure" title of the U.S. code.46 While
very little scholarship has emerged beyond that of Dellapenna and
Fox (although some recent articles do raise points similar to those
of Fox),47 both Fox and Dellapenna, nonetheless, discuss the
41 HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 320 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Fox,
2nd ed.]. The textual provision Fox quotes will be discussed in greater detail at a later
point in this Article. See infra Part III.
42 Fox, 2nd ed., supra note 41. These circumstances will also be discussed in
conjunction with an analysis of specific cases in detail below. See infra Part III.
43 JOSEPH DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS
37-41 (2d ed. 2003).
44 Id. at 37.
45 Id
46 Id
47 See Chimene Keitner, Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and
Goldsmith, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 1, 1 (2010). As will be discussed below, there is
emerging scholarship on whether "indictable" acts required for civil RICO claims are
permitted under the FSIA's text. See infra Part III.A. At least one article has concluded
that they are not permitted because, inter alia, there is no jurisdiction over criminal
claims against foreign sovereign. See John D. Corrigan, Note, Restricting RICO under
FSIA, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1477, 1495-96 (2010) (concluding that foreign states should
2012] 51
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emerging international criminal law movement, and in relation to
that trend, the potential for a more restrictive approach to the
criminal immunity of states and their officials.4 8
Federal courts are unsure of the FSIA's criminal law reach as
well. A split has emerged amongst the circuits as to whether the
FSIA grants foreign states, their political sub-divisions, and their
agencies and instrumentalities immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.4 9 The majority of the courts of appeals
that have confronted the question have concluded either that the
FSIA does not pertain to immunity from criminal jurisdiction or
have gone to great lengths to avoid addressing the merits of the
issue altogether. The Sixth Circuit concluded that section 1604
does include criminal jurisdiction and that sovereigns are indeed
immune from all criminal actions because the exceptions under
Sections 1605 and 1607 are only meant for civil actions.o One
district court in the Fifth Circuit held that Section 1604 confers
criminal immunity.' The Tenth Circuit has concluded that
Section 1604 does not pertain to criminal jurisdiction.52  The
Eleventh Circuit views the statute as a civil one, and a district
court within its ambit recently used that conclusion to deny
immunity for a criminal prosecution. 53 As recently 2010, a district
have immunity from civil RICO claims for a variety of reasons related to the text and
structure of the FSIA as well as immunity rules and other policy concerns). Others have
noted ambiguity. See Nicole S. Garbarino, Recent Development, Adler v. Nigeria: What
Congress Forgot to Say About Minimum Contacts and the Criminality of Commercial
Conduct, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 561, 578-80 (2001) (noting ambiguities in the
FSIA regarding the criminality of commercial activity).
48 DELLAPENNA, supra note 43, at 40-41; Fox, 2nd ed., supra note 41, at 97.
49 United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 1000-01 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting the
circuit split and noting that the Eleventh Circuit had stated, in dictum, that the FSIA does
not apply to criminal actions, but resolving the immunity question on other grounds).
50 Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 2002).
51 Dale v. Colagiovanni, 337 F. Supp. 2d 825, 842-43 (S.D. Miss. 2004), aff'd on
other grounds, 443 F.3d 425 (2006).
52 Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 198 F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that it was irrelevant for the purposes of the FSIA's commercial activity
exception whether the defendant's alleged racketeering was criminal), aff'g 994 F.
Supp. 1299 (D. Colo. 1998).
53 United States v. Emmanuel, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48510, at *9-10 (S.D. Fla.
2007), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing
the holding in United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997), noting
that the FSIA "does not address" criminal cases, and using it to deny sovereign immunity
52 [Vol. XXXVIII
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court within the First Circuit concluded that the FSIA has no
relevance in criminal actions.54 The Ninth and D.C. Circuits have
characterized the statute as a "civil" one and therefore appear to be
leaning strongly away from the conclusion that Section 1604
includes criminal jurisdiction.5 ' The Second Circuit has attempted
to avoid the issue altogether, although there are district courts
within its ambit that have concluded that the FSIA is an entirely
civil statute and those that have held that at least Section 1604
covers immunity from criminal jurisdiction.5 6  Nonetheless, in
many cases, these courts are not facing the same precise question,
and so it is necessary to understand the contexts in which the
question of criminal jurisdiction arises.
III.Cases Addressing the FSIA's Criminal Coverage
A. Cases Directly Addressing Section 1604
One of the first, if not the first case, to address the effect of the
FSIA's conferral of criminal immunity (or lack thereof), was
Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co.," wherein the court
was forced to consider whether a civil action pursuant to the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
could stand under the FSIA." The plaintiff, Mitsui Corporation,
sued, inter alia, a corporation owned by the French government
for misappropriating and utilizing trade secrets." The civil RICO
statute requires that the predicate actions underlying the alleged
RICO violation be "indictable."o The plaintiff averred that the
to an individual defendant).
54 In re Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d 173, 177-80 (D.P.R. 2010).
55 See Alder v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 875-76 (9th Cir. 2000);
see also Vine v. Republic of Iraq, 459 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2006).
56 Compare United States v. Hendron, 813 F. Supp. 973, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(concluding that there is no criminal immunity under the FSIA), with In re Terrorist
Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 792-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (concluding
that criminal immunity does exist under the FSIA).
57 750 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ohio 1990) motion granted by 820 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 43 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1994).
58 Id. at 841.
59 Id at 840-41.
60 Id. at 844.
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defendant corporation's actions constituted mail and wire fraud.61
Therefore, the court determined that in order to decide whether a
civil RICO claim was possible against a qualifying sovereign
entity under the FSIA, it had to analyze, first, whether the FSIA's
coverage included criminal jurisdiction and, second, how that
determination would affect a plaintiffs ability to bring a civil
RICO claim.6 2
On the first question, the court based its analysis solely on the
FSIA's text and legislative history. It concluded that Section 1604
is sufficiently broadly worded to encompass both civil and
criminal actions and that nothing in the legislative history refuted
that conclusion.63 Thus, according to the court, foreign states
generally have immunity from criminal prosecution."4 However,
the court also noted the FSIA only expressly confers jurisdiction
on federal district courts to adjudicate cases that fall within one of
the FSIA's exceptions in civil actions. 65 For this reason, the court
concluded that a federal district court could not take jurisdiction
over a criminal matter, even if the matter might conceivably fall
within one of the FSIA's exceptions. The court ultimately
determined that for an act to be "indictable" within the meaning of
RICO it would need to be an act for which the actor could be
convicted.6' An immune sovereign could not, in reality, be
convicted of anything, so no action was possible.68
Interestingly, the Mitsui court took pains to carve out an
avenue for criminal responsibility of individuals associated with
the state, but it did not delineate the exact contours of this point.
Specifically, the court noted that individual officials acting outside
of the scope of their official authority might render themselves
susceptible to criminal prosecution.69  This idea connects to an
ultra vires loophole in civil suits against foreign officials in U.S.
61 Id. at 841.
62 Id. at 843.
63 Gould, 750 F.Supp at 843-44.
64 Id. at 844.
65 Id; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2006).
66 Gould, 750 F. Supp. at 844.
67 Id
68 Id
69 Id
54 [Vol. XXXVIII
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT
courts, which can also apply to certain U.S. officials.70 The
underlying principle is that abusive official actions strip the
individual official of his derivative immunity from the state. This
is also the idea that underlies the removal of immunity in
constitutional tort cases when an official's actions are "under the
color of law," but in violation of a clearly established
constitutional right so that the government officer cannot be said
to be acting officially, and therefore, is personally liable." The act
is seen as so unconstitutional that it cannot be official.
In another case, this construct was utilized by the government
in arguing against criminal immunity for a Liberian official under
the FSIA in a prosecution according to the federal criminal statute
executing the U.N. Convention on Torture.72 The government
argued that it was not prosecuting the defendant for acting in his
official capacity, but rather for acting in his personal capacity
"under the color of law" or, rather, acting in a way that abused his
position under the law.73 The court ultimately dismissed the
defendant's arguments for immunity because it concluded that the
FSIA did not apply to criminal actions.74
The Sixth Circuit later generally agreed with Mitsui's holding.
In Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria," the plaintiff, a sales
representative for "mobile hospital and medical centers," was
defrauded out of approximately $28,000 by individuals pretending
to enter into an agreement with him for the exclusive rights to
distribute his facilities in Nigeria.7 6 The plaintiff brought suit
against individual and sovereign plaintiffs, alleging civil RICO
claims, and common law tort and contract claims.77 Like in
70 See infra note 282 (citing cases using the ultra vires analysis).
71 See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); see also Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (concluding that enforcing an unconstitutional
enactment strips an official of any immunity and subjects him to suit in a personal
capacity).
72 United States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-CR-Altonga, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48510, at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2007) (addressing the issue under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A
(2006)).
73 Id. at *39-40.
74 Id. at *40-41.
75 277 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2002).
76 Id. at 814-15.
77 Id. at 814.
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Mitsui, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Section
1604's grant of immunity included criminal jurisdiction.8 In
doing so, the circuit relied on the statements of the Supreme Court
that the FSIA is the exclusive means for obtaining jurisdiction over
a foreign sovereign in U.S. courts, and on the broad language in
Section 1604.79
Proceeding to the question of indictable acts,80 the Keller court
rejected the plaintiffs argument that RICO concerns itself with
acts rather than actors." Citing to Sixth Circuit precedent that
agencies of the federal government are not subject to civil RICO
claims because they are not "indictable" entities,8 2 the Keller court
stated that it would be disingenuous to conclude that the federal
government is immune from civil RICO suits, but not a foreign
government.8 ' The holding, thus, might have a comity-related
basis 84-although the court did not expressly articulate that
reasoning. Like in Mitsui, however, the court noted that officials
might still be subject to civil RICO suits if they acted ultra vires or
outside of the scope of their official authority.
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit in Southway v. Central Bank of
Nigeria8 6 reached a different result." There, the plaintiffs sought
to recover certain investment funds from the Republic of Nigeria
and its central bank, which two employees had allegedly stolen in
a scam to collect money from an over-invoiced contract for oil
drilling machinery." Suit was again brought under the civil RICO
78 Id. at 820.
79 Id. at 819-20.
80 See id at 820. The court also considered whether indictable acts can be
commercial activity. Id This will be discussed in a later section. See infra Part III.B.
81 Keller, 277F.3d at820-21.
82 Id. (citing Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991); McNeily v.
United States, 6 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1993)).
83 Id
84 See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
85 See Keller, 277 F.3d at 821 ("We note that although a foreign sovereign is not
indictable, and therefore not amenable to civil RICO claims, the same conclusions may
not follow for individuals who commit criminal acts; such unlawfulness may indicate
that they were acting without the authority of the sovereign.").
86 198 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 1999).
87 See id. at 1212.
88 Id. at 1212-13.
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statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.9 The defendants moved to
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds under the FSIA, arguing:
(1) the acts on which the claim was predicated were not
"indictable" because foreign sovereigns cannot be indicted or (2)
alleged criminal acts of that kind do not fall under the FSIA's
commercial activity exception.
The court rejected both arguments. It concluded that the FSIA
does not address criminal acts and, therefore, a civil RICO claim
could stand: "If Congress intended [defendants].. .to be immune
from criminal indictment under the FSIA, then Congress should
amend FSIA to expressly so state."" The court also concluded
that because Congress and the executive had not expressly granted
sovereign immunity for criminal acts, a court could not grant that
immunity in the first instance.9 2 The court held that, essentially,
there is no immunity unless expressly conferred by the political
branches.93 Clarifying its holding, the court stated:
[W]e do not hold that FSIA confers criminal jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns. We simply conclude that because FSIA
does not address criminal sovereign immunity, Defendants'
argument that they enjoy criminal sovereign immunity under the
FSIA, and thus cannot commit indictable acts for purposes of a
civil RICO claim necessarily fails.94
89 Id. at 1213 ("Plaintiffs further alleged that Defendants' scheme violated RICO,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 & 1964.").
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1214-15.
92 See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1214-15 ("The executive and legislative branches of
our government are the principal players in the field of foreign relations and international
comity, and consequently are much better equipped than a court of law to address the
question of foreign sovereign immunity in the criminal context.").
93 Id. The court also distinguished the Sixth Circuit precedent cited by the court in
Keller relating to the indictability of federal agencies. Id. at 1215 n.5. It did so based on
the distinct history of the doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity and domestic
immunity. Id. The latter being absolutely immune unless it consents to suit, and the
former being immune at the prerogative of the domestic sovereign. Id. This distinction
is not necessarily meaningful as applied to acts the nature of which are essentially the
same-government-associated entities acting in the same manner that any private entity
would. This is not to question the prerogative of Congress to grant or deny immunity
under RICO for federal agencies, but the foreign/domestic sovereign distinction is less
meaningful in the context of restrictive immunity for "private" actions.
94 Id. at 1214 n.4.
2012] 57
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The court did not expressly consider the possibility that a
common law rule derived from international law might grant the
defendants immunity, or that it might limit the capacity of a
foreign sovereign (or derivative entity) to commit an act that is
indictable under municipal (domestic U.S.) law.9 5 In sum,
Southway, Keller, and Mitsui addressed the issue of the FSIA's
criminal coverage as a threshold for reaching the question of
whether the immunity could attach to the indictable acts necessary
for a civil RICO claim, which requires an "indictable act." But, as
the next section will argue, it is questionable as to whether they
even needed to reach that issue.96
Some district courts have had occasion to directly address the
question of the FSIA's criminal coverage in the context of an
actual criminal prosecution. In the case of In re Grand Jury
Proceedings Related to M'V Deltuva97 a ship flying a Lithuanian
flag and owned by the Lithuanian Shipping Company, which was
carrying commercial cargo bound for the U.S. port at Puerto Rico,
was boarded by the Coast Guard and found to be in violation of
the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships because it discharged oil
while at sea." As the Lithuanian Shipping Company is majority-
owned by the Lithuanian government, the Lithuanian Ministry of
Transportation filed a letter with the Department of Homeland
Security confirming that the vessel was owned by Lithuania and
asking that it be released,99 but the executive took no further action
on the case."oo Ultimately the Department of Justice (DOJ) took
up the case for criminal prosecution."o' The Lithuanian
95 See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1214 n.4 ("Lest any confusion exist, we do not hold
that the FSIA confers criminal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. We simply conclude
that because FSIA does not address criminal sovereign immunity, Defendants' argument
that they enjoy criminal sovereign immunity under the FSIA, and thus cannot commit
indictable 'acts' for purposes of a civil RICO claim, necessarily fails.").
96 See, e.g., American Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 653 F. Supp. 861, 864-65 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (concluding that Air France was
subject to suit under RICO because it was engaged in a commercial activity in the same
way as any private player in the market would, regardless of the fact that company was
majority owned by a foreign sovereign).
97 752 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D.P.R. 2010).
98 Id. at 175-76.
99 Id
100 Id. at 176.
101 Id
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government sought an order quashing the grand jury subpoena.102
In support and opposition of the motion, the parties made
numerous arguments for and against the applicability of certain
foreign and domestic laws.'o3 The court declined to consider any
of those because they were not appropriate until the motion to
dismiss phase."
The U.S. government asserted that the FSIA does not apply to
criminal cases, or if it does, then the exception for commercial
activity in Section 1605 applied to grant jurisdiction over the
vessel.os Lithuania asserted that the FSIA applies to both criminal
and civil actions and that no exception applied.0 6 The court noted
a split of authority concerning the scope of coverage of the FSIA,
analyzing various district court cases from other circuits,0 7
including Mitsui and a case concluding that the FSIA has no
criminal application, United States v. Hendron.'s
The Hendron case involved the criminal prosecution of an
officer of a company that was wholly-owned by the Polish
government.'09  The defendant was indicted on charges of
"conspiracy, importation into the United States of assault
weapons, importing arms without a license, and the transaction of
business involving proceeds of unlawful activity."''0  The
defendant argued that the court should dismiss the indictment
against him because during the time that he engaged in the
questionable activity, he was doing so in his role as an officer for
that state owned company."' The district court did an exhaustive
analysis of the language used in various provisions in the FSIA, its
exceptions to immunity, and its remedies and concluded that the
phrasing and design of those provisions implied application to
102 Id. at 174.
103 Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
104 Id. at 176.
105 Id. at 180.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 180.
108 813 F. Supp. 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), motion granted by 820 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 43 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1994).
109 813 F. Supp. at 974.
110 Id.
'1' Id.
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only civil cases."l
In Deltuva, utilizing the textual analysis from Hendron and
Mitsui, the court was unable to find any basis in the text of the
FSIA itself or its legislative history to support its application to
criminal proceedings." 3 Further, it relied on the language from
Verlinden and United States v. Noriega,"4 indicating that the
FSIA is only a civil statute."' Finding no other basis on which to
quash the subpoena, the court denied the defendant's motion."16
Again, there was no consideration of an alternate source of
criminal sovereign immunity for the Deltuva absent, perhaps,
intervention by the executive."' The docket reflects that the DOJ
ultimately withdrew the prosecution and the case was closed."'
B. Cases Addressing Civil Suits on the Basis of Criminal
Behavior
After a court addresses whether Section 1604 applies to
criminal jurisdiction, it must next address what effect the
application of the exceptions in Sections 1605 and 1607 have. Are
those exceptions only for civil cases? Even if one assumes that
Section 1604 does not include the criminal jurisdiction of the
courts, the same question can arise as to whether behavior that is
criminal in nature can be the basis for a civil claim under, for
example, the commercial activity exception.
It is not entirely clear why there is considerable debate
regarding this matter, because when private parties are involved,
conduct that is criminal in nature can often be the subject of a civil
claim.1' Criminal assault can, for example, be the subject of a
civil suit.'20 And, fraud, which is criminal, can invalidate a
112 Id. at 974-77.
113 In re Grand Jury Proceedings Related to MN Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d 173,
178-80 (D.P.R. 2010).
114 117 F.3d 1206 (llth Cir. 1997).
115 Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 178-80.
116 Id. at 180.
117 See id at 179-80.
I1s USCA Judgment as to Notice of Interlocutory Appeal Filed by PC Lithuanian
Shipping Company; Voluntarily Dismissed, No. 3:10MC00223 (Feb. 16, 2011).
119 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 15-16 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the
interaction between the criminal law and the civil law).
120 Compare People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 44-45 (N.Y. 1986) (describing
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contract in the civil context. 12 A difference in this context for
entities that have a sovereign connection would seem to undercut
the purpose of the FSIA exceptions because they were meant to
provide for suit when the sovereign or sovereign connected party
acts just as any other private party would.12 2  Yet, courts have
repeatedly addressed whether criminal behavior can properly be
the subject of civil claims under the FSIA.123
Before proceeding to the lower court decisions, there are two
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that give significant guidance as to
the spectrum of activities characterized as commercial under the
attempted murder charges brought in a criminal case against defendant, who shot several
men repeatedly on a subway under disputed circumstances), with Complaint for
Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages and Permanent Injunction §§ 1-24,
Cabey v. Goetz, No. 6747-1985 (N.Y. Jan. 30, 1985), available at
http://www.lectlaw.com/files/cas91 (describing the same subway incident in a civil claim
brought against the shooter, seeking $25 million in punitive damages).
121 An Arizona appellate court opinion explains this well:
"It is not uncommon to find allegations in civil action complaints that charge
defendants with a violation of a criminal statute." . . . Indeed, criminal and civil
statutes contain different burdens of proof, and whether a defendant is liable
civilly based upon certain acts is a separate inquiry from whether he or she may
be convicted in a criminal proceeding.. .. As the [appellant] points out, [an
Arizona statute] makes it a felony for "[a] person charged with performance of
any duty under any law relating to elections [to] knowingly refuse[] to perform
such duty, or. . . , in his official capacity, [to] knowingly act[] in violation of
any provision of such law." Yet parties may nevertheless initiate civil
proceedings and seek civil remedies for any harm arising out of an election
official's action or inaction that also would give rise to criminal culpability. . . .
In addition, there are many "other instances in which civil remedies are
permitted for acts which also carry criminal penalties, e.g., wrongful death
actions and murder or manslaughter criminal charges and criminal prosecution
under [Arizona Statutes] § 45-112 and civil actions for damages for diverting
water from a stream."
Ford v. Pima Cnty. Comm. of the Ariz. Libertarian Party, Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 2010-0001,
2010 Ariz. App. LEXIS 193, *9-11 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2010).
122 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Related to MN Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d
173, 180 n.3 (D.P.R. 2010) ("The Court also finds it appropriate to note that, even if
FSIA were to apply, as the MN Deltuva was engaged in delivering a commercial
shipment of goods to the United States at the time when it was detained, the commercial
activity exception to FSIA would likely apply in the instant case to grant this Court
subject matter jurisdiction." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).
123 See, e.g., Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 198 F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (10th
Cir. 1999); Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 178-80; United States v. Hendron, 813 F. Supp.
973, 974-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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FSIA. As the Supreme Court has noted, the FSIA is confusing
because, although it defines "commercial activity" as "either a
regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act," 24 it does not define the term "commercial"
itself.125  In the first decision, Republic of Argentina, et al. v.
Weltover,126 the Court made it clear that the issuance of bonds for
sovereign debt purposes is commercial activity if courts correctly
divorce the nature of the activity, the issuance of "garden-variety
debt instruments,"l2 7 from its arguably sovereign purpose-a
government's issuance of bonds to back its assumption of the "risk
of currency depreciation in cross-border transactions"l2-a
distinction which the FSIA expressly instructs courts to make.129
The general rule that the Court announced was that commercial
activity for purposes of the FSIA occurs whenever a "foreign
government acts, not as a regulator of the market, but in the
manner of a private player within it."'3 0
In the second case, Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,"' the Court
concluded that when a Saudi hospital used the police to punish and
torture a would-be whistleblower whom the hospital had recruited
from the United States, it was acting in a distinctly sovereign
capacity because it was using its police power.132 The court made
this decision over the objection of other justices who saw the
running of a hospital and the punishing of whistleblowers as
activities in which any private player in the market could
engage.'"' Justice White, in his concurrence in judgment, posited
that if the hospital had used a gang of thugs, rather than the police,
124 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2006). The Section goes on to state: "The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." Id.
125 See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 610 (1992).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 615.
128 Id. at 609.
129 Id. at 611.
130 Id. at 614.
131 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
132 Id. at 360-61.
133 See, e.g., id. at 366 (White, J., concurring); id. at 378-79 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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the majority's conclusion might have been different.'
For purposes of this discussion these two decisions are
relevant because together they caution courts to disregard purpose
or motivation to the greatest extent possible, and because in
Nelson it was not the wrongful, arguably criminal, nature of the
activities that made the FSIA's exceptions inapplicable, but rather
the fact that the majority considered it a police power, and
therefore, sovereign activity.'
Turning to decisions in the lower courts, there is a debate
about whether the illegal nature of activities disqualifies them
from falling within the FSIA's commercial activity exception. At
one end of the spectrum is the view espoused most recently in a
case in the Southern District of New York against several Saudi
organizations and Saudi princes for giving money to charitable
organizations that supported terrorist activities, Burnett v. Al
Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp.'36 There, the court concluded that, in
order for conduct to satisfy the commercial activity exception
under the FSIA, it must be a commercial activity, which a private
party can engage in "lawfully.""' It based this holding
substantially on the Second Circuit's decision in Letelier v.
Republic of Chile,' wherein that court rejected the conclusion
that a Chilean airline's transportation of individuals and explosives
to carry out an assassination of a political opponent on U.S. soil
was a commercial activity.' The Letelier court also concluded
that the carriage of passengers and materials is a commercial
activity, but that nucleus of fact was not the heart of the plaintiff s
allegations against the airline. 40 Rather, the plaintiff accused the
airline of conspiring to engage in state-sponsored terrorism to
assassinate a political opponent."' This reasoning seems
hopelessly at odds with the FSIA's strict prohibition on conflating
134 Id. at 366-67 (White J., concurring).
135 Id. at 361 ("However monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be . . . a foreign
state's exercise of the power of its police has long been understood for purposes of the
restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature.").
136 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 792-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
137 Id. at 793.
138 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984).
139 Id. at 797.
140 Id.
'41 Id
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the purpose of the activity with its nature for purposes of
determining whether it is commercial.
Over ten years after Letelier, in Burnett, the district court
seemed to ignore both Supreme Court precedent that had made the
nature versus purpose distinction clearer, as well as a recent
amendment to the FSIA that permitted suits on the basis of state-
sponsored terrorism. Instead, the Burnett Court emphasized that,
even though the Second Circuit had concluded that in the domestic
context money laundering is a "quintessential economic activity,"
it is simply not the case for the FSIA statutory scheme.'42
Burnett's holding is puzzling and troubling on two levels. First, if
fully implemented, Burnett would require courts to go through the
difficult threshold step in commercial activity cases of determining
whether the activity in question is one that a party can engage in
lawfully.'4 3 This requirement finds no basis in the FSIA's text, its
legislative history, or other case law.1' Second, it disconnects the
FSIA from other common law civil claims in a way that is not
warranted. Although, for Article III purposes, claims finding
jurisdiction under the FSIA arise under federal law,'4 5 the claims
brought under the commercial activity section find their bases in
domestic law, i.e., state contract/tort law or federal/state statutes,
142 Burnett, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
143 See id (demonstrating that this question will be part of the analysis by arguing
that "[tihe Second Circuit has made very clear that, for purposes of the FSIA, a
commercial activity must be one in which a private person can engage lawfully").
144 See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006)
(stating that a foreign state will be subject to liability if plaintiffs cause of action arose
from commercial activity carried out by the foreign state); Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992) ("[O]ur analysis is therefore limited to considering
whether this lawsuit is (1) 'based . . . upon an act outside the territory of the United
States'; (2) that was taken 'in connection with a commercial activity' of Argentina
outside this country; and (3) that 'caused a direct effect in the United States."'); Callejo
v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1108, (5th Cir. 1985) ("In determining whether the
commercial activity exception applies, the critical question is usually whether the
relevant activity is commercial or sovereign in nature-whether it is ajure gestionis or
ajure imperiu, a private or a public act."); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 16 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614-15 (stating that what is critical in
determining whether a sovereign state falls under the commercial activity exception is
the activity itself).
145 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983) ("[T]he
'Arising Under' Clause of Art. III provides an appropriate basis for the statutory grant of
subject-matter jurisdiction to actions by foreign plaintiffs under the Act.").
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which do often permit civil and criminal claims on the same set of
facts. 146
On appeal from the district court's decision in Burnett, the
Second Circuit cited Letelier, but then rejected that court's
reasoning because applying the FSIA's tort and commercial
activity exceptions to the Saudi princes' terrorist funding activities
would have conflated the nature versus purpose distinction.
Specifically, the plaintiffs in Burnett had merged the purpose of
the act, which was funding terrorism, with the nature of the act,
which was giving away money.'4 7 This reasoning would have
arguably reversed the holding in Letelier, because the carriage of
persons and materials could have been separated from the
assassination. Ultimately, however, the Second Circuit declined to
consider whether a criminal act (e.g., money laundering) could
ever be considered commercial for the purposes of the FSIA.148 It
concluded that the Saudi Princes' acts fell outside of the
commercial activity exception because giving money away to
charity is not by nature a commercial activity.149
146 Dammarell v. Iran, No. 01-2224 (JDB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5343, at *28
(D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005) ("To this day, it is customary for courts to look to state law for
the causes of action under the 'commercial activities' and 'non-commercial torts'
exceptions to the FSIA."), superseded in part by statute, 1997 Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009, 172 (1997) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1605A (Supp. 11 2006)), motion granted in part, motion denied in part, 370 F.
Supp. 2d 218 (D.D.C.). Congress has now provided for an express cause of action under
the FSIA for state-sponsors of terrorism. See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F.
Supp. 2d 53, 65-66 (D.D.C. 2008) (describing that claims for terrorist activities used to
be brought under the laws of states but noting that Congress had created an express cause
of action to eliminate inconsistencies).
147 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 538 F.3d 71, 91-92 (2d. Cir. 2008),
aff'g 392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
148 See id ("This argument [i.e. the Princes' funding of terrorist groups was a
commercial activity] fails because 'it goes to purpose, the very fact the Act renders
irrelevant to the question of an activity's commercial character."').
149 See id. at 92. It is also notable that prior to the Second Circuit's holding,
another case in the Southern District of New York directly disagreed with the Burnett
court's holding. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Societe Nationale De Petroles du Congo, 05
Civ. 5101 (LAP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14264, at *40.42 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006),
rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom.; Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147 (2d
Cir. 2007). At issue in that case was the misappropriation of natural resources, namely,
stolen oil from the Congo. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14264 at *2-4. The Second Circuit
cursorily dismissed the issue of whether the oil was stolen as irrelevant to its analysis,
which turned on whether the cause of action was based on an activity in the United
652012]
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has perhaps the most
convincing analysis on this issue. The primary case, Adler v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria,'s involved an illegal agreement
between Nigerian officials to convert Nigerian government funds
for their own personal use."' The plaintiff, an American citizen,
sued the Nigerian government for the money he had expended to
bribe various officials.'5 2 The government claimed that activity for
an illegal purpose could not be commercial in nature within the
meaning of the FSIA's commercial activity exception.' The
Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's contentions. 154
The first noteworthy aspect of the Ninth Circuit's decision is
that the court did not appear to think it necessary to consider the
breadth of Section 1604 and the FSIA's criminal jurisdiction
before proceeding to the question of whether otherwise criminal
acts could form the basis for a commercial activity in a civil action
against a foreign state.'55 Instead, the Circuit focused its attention
on the nature of the activity, which, it emphasized, was in
conformity with the Supreme Court's relevant jurisprudence. 5 6
Where the activity is of such a nature that any private player could
engage in it, then the state is acting as a private player and not as a
"regulator" or in another specifically sovereign capacity.'
Therefore, the key question is whether the activity is "the type ...
by which a private party engages in trade and commerce."5 '
Thus, the Circuit ultimately concluded: that "[w]hen the Nigerian
officials offered [plaintiff] a cash commission for participating in
an enterprise for mutual advantage they did essentially what every
private party does in the open market (notwithstanding the fact
States, which is required for the FSIA to confer jurisdiction on the court in question. 505
F.3d at 154 n.4. Noting that the criminality of the conduct did not destroy its
commercial nature, the court concluded that the alleged money laundering was "plainly"
commercial. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14264 at *40-42
150 219 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2000).
151 Id. at 870.
152 Id
153 Id at 874.
154 Id at 874-76.
155 See id., 219 F.3d at 875.
156 Adler, 219 F.3d at 875-76.
157 Id. at 875.
158 Id
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that their precise undertakings were illegal)." 9 The Ninth Circuit
maintained, however, that "[n]ot all criminal activity falls within
the FSIA's commercial activity exception."l60 It cited cases in
which murder, 16 1 assassination,162 and the making of unauthorized
telephone callsl63 were not considered commercial activities.'"
Although the Supreme Court's explication of the FSIA's
nature versus purpose distinction was grounded more on the
premise (or distinction) that commercial activity occurs when the
sovereign-related entity is acting as any other private actor in the
market,165 the Ninth Circuit's holding that criminal motives can be
also largely irrelevant to the commercial nature of activity is
consistent with that framework.16 6  Civil actions for otherwise
criminal behavior, which is commercial within the meaning of the
FSIA's provisions, do not interfere with public functions of the
state, and therefore do not violate the spirit of the commercial
activity exception.167 Part of what makes the Ninth Circuit's
analysis helpful-and what other courts in civil RICO cases
should consider-is that it focuses more on the acts in question
than on the actors.'68 With some exception, the FSIA itself
159 Id. at 875-76.
160 Id. at 875.
161 Berkovitz v. Iran, 735 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1984).
162 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Alhadhood, 82 F.3d 658, 664 (5th Cir. 1996).
163 Letelier v. Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'g 488 F. Supp. 665
(D.D.C. 1980).
164 Alder, 219 F.3d at 875.
165 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 610 (1992) ("In accord with
that description, we conclude that when a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a
market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign's actions are
"commercial" within the meaning of the FSIA.").
166 E.g., Alder, 219 F.3d at 875 ("The fact that the contract was for an illegal
purpose, and therefore was unenforceable, does nothing to destroy its commercial
nature.").
167 See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006) ("The Congress
finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states to
immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would ... protect the rights of both foreign
states and litigants.").
168 See Alder, 219 F.3d at 874 ("It also instructs that 'the commercial character of
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."' (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(e) (2006))).
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focuses primarily on the activity when determining whether suit is
permitted.169  It is not productive to engage in a rather circular
debate in the FSIA context on whether the actor could be
indicted.'70 Furthermore, in many cases, there will not even need
to be commentary on whether the actions of a foreign sovereign
could constitute a crime because the criminal and civil causes of
action may have materially different standards or burdens of
proof.'"'
This also makes sense in light of the FSIA's terrorism
exception, which allows private citizens to sue foreign officials for
compensation for death and property damage caused by terrorist
activities abroad.'72 In rejecting the argument that the "rule of
lenity" applies to the terrorism exception, the D.C. Circuit made a
compelling common-sense argument:
[Defendant] fails to recognize that it is a defendant in a case
brought under the state-sponsored terrorism exception of FSIA,
which waives immunity only for civil claim .... The fact that
the state-sponsored terrorism exception incorporates a definition
from a treaty that covers 'penal matters' does not change the fact
that [defendant] here is susceptible to solely civil penalties ....
Because FSIA is not a criminal statute, and [defendant] is not a
criminal defendant, the rule of lenity has no application.173
Most of the debate about the "criminality" of actions could be
put aside unless the criminal nature of a set of facts in a civil claim
has a significant implication or implications regarding, perhaps,
the interference with a sovereign's immunity for other claims or
prosecutions. In the commercial activity cases described above,
169 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006) (stating that foreign states are not immune
to suit when they engage in commercial activity concerning the United States).
170 See Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 198 F.3d 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that it was irrelevant for the purposes of the FSIA's commercial activity
exception whether the defendant's alleged racketeering was criminal).
171 United States v. Hendron, 813 F. Supp. 973, 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
172 Vine v. Iraq, 459 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2006) ("The most recent of the
[FISA] exceptions ... provides that a foreign state 'shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case' where 'money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused
by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the
provision of material support or resources . . . for such an act."'), rev'd sub nom.
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848 (2009).
173 Id. at 18 n.6.
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no court has been able to point to a particularly salient implication,
although that may ultimately depend on how one decides to treat
the idea of restrictive criminal sovereign immunity.
C. Criminal Law Violations Incidental to Official Conduct?
There is another class of cases in which a foreign official, or
someone claiming to be, has violated domestic criminal law by
performing an act that he or she argues falls under the cloak of
official authority or within the range of his or her official
functions.
In one type of case, the official has violated U.S. law by
exercising discretion that might exempt her from suit under the
tort provisions of the FSIA. The FSIA's discretionary exemption
comes from the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which it is
interpreted in line with,'7 4 and provides that the provision
permitting tort suits against a foreign state or its agencies shall not
apply to "any claim based upon the exercise or performance or
failure to exercise . .. a discretionary function regardless of
whether the discretion be abused."'75
Courts examining cases in which illegal conduct is alleged to
have been "discretionary" in this sense have exhibited discomfort
with the circumstances and found various ways to rule that
exemption inapplicable. In Letelier v. Republic of Chile,176 the
United States District Court of the District of Columbia concluded
that criminal activity-the Pinochet government's brutal killing of
Chile's former ambassador to the United States on U.S. soil-
could not qualify the official for the discretionary function
exemption, because, as the court bluntly and broadly concluded:
"there is no discretion to commit, or to have one's officers or
174 Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir.
1987) (citing Olsen v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 646-47 (9th Cir. 1984),
abrogated by Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.
1987)) ("The existence of a discretionary function under the FSIA is generally analyzed
under the principles developed pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act's ("FTCA")
discretionary function exception.").
"s 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (2006).
176 Letelier v. Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980), superseded by statute, 1997
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009, 172
(1997), rev 'd 748 F.2d 790, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1984).
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agents commit, an illegal act." 77
Similar reasoning was applied in Liu v. Republic of China,' in
which a widow sued for wrongful death on the basis of her
husband's assassination on U.S. soil by Taiwanese intelligence
authorities.'79 In examining the assassin's behavior under the
discretionary function exemption, the court employed the Supreme
Court's two-part test under the FTCA, asking (1) if there was an
element of choice in the official's actions and (2) if the decision
was grounded in social, economic, or political policy.o8 0 Relying
in part on Letelier's reasoning, the court concluded the assassin
had no discretion to violate the Republic of China's rule against
murder, and therefore the defendant failed on the first prong of the
test.'5 '
In the case of Gerritsen v. de la Madrid Hurtado,182 the
plaintiff alleged tort causes of action for assault and battery on the
basis of being assaulted with a weapon, struck and kidnapped by
consular employees after distributing leaflets critical of the
Mexican government in front of the Mexican consulate.'8 3 The
Ninth Circuit ignored the consular employees' criminal or illegal
conduct, concluding instead that they could not be considered
discretionary because they were "operational" activities as
opposed to "planning level" decisions or "decisions to establish
177 Id. at 673 ("While it seems apparent that a decision calculated to result in injury
or death to a particular individual or individuals, made for whatever reason, would be
one most assuredly involving policy judgment and decision and thus exempt as a
discretionary act under section 1605(a)(5)(A), that exception is not applicable to bar this
suit. As it has been recognized, there is no discretion to commit, or to have one's
officers or agents commit, an illegal act.... Whatever policy options may exist for a
foreign country, it has no 'discretion' to perpetrate conduct designed to result in the
assassination of an individual or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to the
precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international law." (citing
Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181, (1956); Cruikshank v. United States, 431
F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. Haw. 1977)).
178 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
179 Id. at 1421.
180 Id. at 1431.
181 Id
182 819 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987), summary judgment granted by sub nom.
Gerritsen v. Cordova, 721 F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1988), affd sub nom. Gerritsen v.
Consulado General de Mexico, 989 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1993).
183 Id. at 1513.
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government policy."' 84
The proposition that emerges from the above cases is that,
when behavior is violent or destructive, the discretionary function
exemption is more likely to be held inapplicable. For example, in
the case of Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General of Nigeria,s5
which did not involve a criminal prosecution or conduct alleged to
be criminal, the Ninth Circuit concluded the "purely destructive"
behavior of consular employees of Nigeria living in a rental
property was not considered exempt when the damage that they
caused to the property was the basis for claims of trespass, waste
and conversion.18 6 In contrast, in MacArthur Area Citizens Ass'n
v. Republic of Peru,'" a citizen group attempted to sue the
Peruvian government for turning a building in a residential zone of
the District of Columbia into a Navy Chancery in violation of
public law and regulation.' The court concluded that the
discretionary exemption applied, and in so doing, decided that
Letelier's holding that criminal activity could not be discretionary
was inapplicable because (1) the D.C. government had not cited
Peru for any criminal violation of zoning regulations and (2) the
criminal act did not rise to the level of culpability of an act malum
in se.189
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Risk v. Halvorsen'90 attempted
to make the distinction between the destructive and violent crimes
and the more malum in prohibitum offenses even clearer.' 9 ' In that
184 Id. at 1517-18 (quoting Olsen v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 647 (9th
Cir. 1984) (citations omitted), abrogated by Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of
Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1987) ("This circuit employs a test which distinguishes
between the 'planning level' of governmental activity and those acts designed to carry
out policy, the 'operational level.' Because decisions at the planning level establish
governmental policy, they are not actionable. But where decisions occur at the
operational level, the discretionary function exemption provides no protection from
liability even though such decisions or acts may involve elements of discretion.").
185 830 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1987).
186 Id. at 1026-27. The consular employees inhabiting the property had broken or
removed various appliances and fixtures. Id. at 1020.
187 809 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated in part, 823 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
188 Id. at 919, 922 n.4
189 Id. at 921-23, 922 n.4.
190 936 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'g Risk v. Kingdom of Norway, 707 F. Supp.
1159 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
191 Id. at 395-97.
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case, the plaintiff brought a tort suit against Norway and
Norwegian consular officials in the United States for allegedly
conspiring to assist his ex-wife to leave the United States with his
two children in violation of a custody order from the California
Superior Court. 192 The order granted the plaintiff and his ex-wife
joint custody and prohibited them from leaving the country with
the children.'9 3 Nevertheless, the consulate had issued documents
permitting the plaintiffs ex-wife and children to do so.1' Upon
Norway's assertion of the discretionary function, the plaintiff
made an ultra vires argument that acts that would constitute
crimes in the United States could not be discretionary functions.'9 5
The court found the discretionary function exemption to
apply.196 Again, the court seemed unconcerned with the actual
criminality of the acts, but it did note that certain purely
destructive or particularly heinous acts could not be considered
discretionary functions.' 97 The court determined that an act that
was purely destructive-i.e., the destruction of property used for a
consular residence-could not be brought within the discretionary
exemption because such activity hardly falls within the range of
activity typically engaged in to run a consular residence.' 98 That
was also true of violent and heinous acts, such as the murders of a
former Chilean official 99 and the political opponents of the
Republic of China 20 0 on U.S. soil, sanctioned by neither U.S. nor
international law.201' The Norwegian officials' actions, which
amounted to the issuance of travel documents to Mr. Risk's ex-
wife, were not so heinous and destructive as to disqualify them
from the discretionary exemption.20 2
Should foreign sovereigns also have license to authorize
192 Id at 394.
193 Id
I94 Id
195 Id. at 396.
196 Risk, 936 F.2d at 395-97.
197 Id. at 395-96.
198 See id. at 395.
199 Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 791 (2d Cir. 1984).
200 Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
201 Risk, 936 F.2d at 396.
202 Id
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violations of federal law? In the United States v. Kashmiri20 3 the
defendant was charged under the U.S. criminal code with the
crime of providing material support to terrorists and terrorist
organizations behind the November 2008 attacks on Mumbai,
India. 204  The defendant argued that he had acted under the
authority of Pakistan intelligence authorities, which are charged
with the protection of Pakistan and which enjoy sovereign
immunity under the FSIA.205 The defendant argued that,
according to the "public authority defense," he was derivatively
206protected by this sovereign immunity. The contours of a public
authority defense are that a defendant who acts "in reliance" on
official authority and "does not act knowingly" is not guilty.207
The defendant acts pursuant to public authority if the defendant is
(1) told his behavior is lawful; (2) the individual so informing the
defendant is an official of the United States; (3) the defendant
relies on the official's statement; and (4) the defendant's reliance
is reasonable. 0 8 The defendant thus attempted to subpoena
various documents from the Department of State to show that
Pakistan had authorized his conduct.209
The district court soundly rejected this defense: "Simply put,
Defendant cannot rely on the authority of a foreign government
agency or official to authorize his violations of United States
federal law."210 The court also noted that the defendant cited no
203 United States v. Kashmiri, No. 09 CR 830-4, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36400
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2011), motion denied for new trial, No. 09 CR 830-4, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82715 (N.D. Ill. June 7,2012).
204 Id. at *2.
205 Id. at *3-5.
206 Id. at *3-4.
207 Id. at *6.
208 Id. at *2.
209 Kashmiri, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36400, at *2.
210 Id. at *5-6; see United States v. Rector, 111 F.3d 503, 506-07 (7th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Wilson, 169 F.3d 418, 427 n.9 (7th
Cir. 1999). The court did not discuss an analogous doctrine (the McLeod Rule), which
was ultimately codified into the Habeas Corpus Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1789), a law
developed to shield officials acting under foreign sovereign orders from prosecution.
See David J. Bederman, Cautionary Tale ofAlexander McLeod: Superior Orders and the
American Writ of Habeas Corpus, 41 EMORY L.J. 515, 533-36 (1992) [hereinaftler
Bederman, Cautionary Tale] (describing how the statute providing for habeas relief to
individuals acting under the orders of a superior had evolved to require a showing that
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authority for the proposition that an individual or entity of a
foreign government could authorize criminal conduct occurring
within the United States.2 11 In addition, the court held, the
defendant had not presented any evidence that a federal official
had authorized his conduct.2 12
IV. New Perspectives on Old Ambiguities
Whatever the arguments presented for and against the FSIA's
criminal coverage, neither the statutory text nor the legislative
history provide a clear answer to this important question. As the
majority of courts have observed, the FSIA is essentially written
as a civil statute.213 The most commonly relied upon provision in
this respect is 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), which grants district courts
original jurisdiction over foreign states, as defined in the FSIA,
expressly for "nonjury civil actions."2 14 All of its other provisions,
including the exceptions to immunity and the provisions on
attachment of property, are worded to function in the civil
211context. In addition, a canvassing of the FSIA's legislative
history shows that the closest Congress came to a mention of
criminal activity is in the antitrust context, but even there it is not
clear whether it was referencing civil or criminal cases.2 16
Recognizing these facts and the ambiguities explored in the case
the soldier being prosecuted in U.S. courts was acting lawfully under international law or
that he was unaware that the orders were unlawful).
211 Kashmiri, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36400, at *8.
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983)
("[T]he Act contains a comprehensive set of legal standards governing claims of
immunity in every civil action against a foreign state or its political subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities.").
214 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2006) ("The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any
nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to
any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable
international agreement.").
215 United States v. Hendron, 813 F. Supp. 973, 974-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (analyzing
a number of provisions in the FSIA and concluding that the "[a]ct contains a panoply of
provisions that are consistent only with an application to civil cases and not to criminal
proceedings").
216 DELLAPENNA, supra note 43, at 37-41.
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law described above, this article argues that the Supreme Court's
approach to interpreting the FSIA in the recent case of Samantar
provides a useful heuristic for rethinking the debate above and the
need for some strong clarification concerning the FSIA's criminal
coverage. As may one day be the case regarding criminal
coverage, Samantar resolved a fairly longstanding debate (of
approximately 20 years) amongst the circuits regarding whether
the FSIA covered foreign officials.
While the Supreme Court decisions interpreting the FSIA have
not been devoid of intense textual analysis, Samantar does a
particularly thorough job of analyzing the text and structure of the
statute. The defendant in the original case was a former Somalian
leader, Muhammad Samantar, who had been sued by victims and
the families of victims of torture and other inhuman and illegal
treatment under the Barre regime in which Samantar held a
number of high ranking posts.217 The district court had ruled that
Samantar was entitled to FSIA immunity, because he could be
considered part of a foreign state, but the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed.21 8 Ultimately, the Supreme Court framed
the debate as whether, despite the absence of an express basis for
coverage of foreign officials in the FSIA's text, those individuals
could nonetheless obtain immunity because they could be
considered part of the "political subdivisions," "agencies" or
"instrumentalities" that comprise a "foreign state" as defined
under the FSIA's Section 1603.219
The Court determined that all of the language used in 1603
pointed to an interpretation of "agency or instrumentality" as
referring to entities only, and not to both entities and natural
persons.22 0 Nothing in the legislative history contradicted this
interpretation, and the Court concluded that where Congress had,
indeed, wanted to refer to officials at other points in the statute, it
had done so expressly.2 2 1 The history and purpose of the FSIA
also did not lend support to the argument that officials were
governed by the statute, because the Court found evidence that
217 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282-84 (2010).
218 Id. at 2282-83.
219 Id. at 2285-86.
220 Id. at 2287-88.
221 Id. at 2287-89.
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state immunity and official immunity were not necessarily co-
extensive in every case.222 It also seemed implausible to the Court
that Congress would codify immunity for official acts into the
FSIA "without so much as a word spelling out how and when
individuals are covered."22 3 Thus, while the argument that
governmental personnel acting in their official capacity would
have immunity made logical sense, it was a less than compelling
argument that the FSIA codified that rule without saying so.2 2 4
The main thrust of the Supreme Court's conclusion against the
inclusion of foreign government officials in the FSIA's definition
of a foreign state was that the FSIA is a "careful[ly] calibrat[ed]"
statute in a number of respects and, while it did not "expressly
foreclose" an alternate reading, its silence on natural persons
should not be interpreted as a mandate for their coverage.225 Quite
to the contrary, in the Court's view, if the silence reflected
anything it was that Congress did not consider the issue, because
at the time of the FSIA's enactment, official immunity for civil
damages under statutes like the Alien Tort Statute was simply not
a problem.226 As one commentator notes, many of the early Alien
Tort cases against foreign officials seemed to simply ignore the
possibility of the type of FSIA immunity that Samantar ultimately
claimed.22 7
There is much that this approach has to lend to the issue of the
FSIA's criminal coverage as well. First, as with the issue of
foreign officials, there is simply no express basis in the text (nor in
the legislative history) to suggest that the FSIA is meant to cover
222 Id. at 2288-91.
223 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291.
224 See id. at 2285, 2290-91.
225 Id. at 2288-89.
226 Id. at 2291-92 (2010). In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980),
the Second Circuit is considered to have revived the Alien Tort Statute from historical
obscurity. See William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the "Originalists, " 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221, 222-23 (1996)
(discussing the Alien Tort Statute's status as one of the "most widely discussed
provisions in modern international law" since Filartiga's emergence). But Filartiga is
not concerned with former official immunity, and the issue does not appear to have
played a significant role, even though it could have. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
227 DELLAPENNA, supra note 43, at 326-38 (discussing Alien Tort Statute cases
through Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989)).
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criminal immunity at all. Key words such as "criminal," "crimes"
and "prosecution" are conspicuously absent. While Section 1604
does not foreclose a reading that criminal immunity is one type of
immunity included, but not excepted, under other sections of the
Statute,228 and, indeed, the provision could be read that broadly,
several things point in favor of reading criminal immunity out of
Section 1604 altogether. As with the coverage of officials, the
structure of the statute makes it quite unbelievable that Congress
would have meant for Section 1604 to grant immunity from all
criminal prosecutions without making it clear that none of the
other provisions in the statute, such as the exceptions to immunity,
apply to criminal prosecutions. It is enticing to argue, as courts
have done, that the implication of the language used in many of
the provisions in the FSIA is that they were intended only for civil
actions,22 but again it seems unsatisfying to say that Congress
would want prosecutors and courts to determine such a key fact by
implying it from the text. Even the provision that uses the word
"civil" expressly, Section 1330(a), does not require a reading that
excludes criminal jurisdiction, but rather can be read to confer
federal jurisdiction where Congress felt it necessary to clarify how
it would work with the diversity statute.2 30 As the Supreme Court
has noted:
FSIA amended the diversity statute to delete references to
suits in which a 'foreign stat[e]' is a party either as plaintiff
or defendant, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(2) and (3) (1970
ed.), and added a new paragraph (4) that preserves
diversity jurisdiction over suits in which foreign states are
plaintiffs. As the legislative history explained, '[s]ince
jurisdiction in actions against foreign states is
comprehensively treated by the new section 1330, a similar
jurisdictional basis under section 1332 becomes
superfluous.' H. R. Rep., at 14; S. Rep., at 13.231
Therefore, regarding Section 1330(a)'s wording, as with
228 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
229 See, e.g., In re Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d 173, 177-80 (D.P.R. 2010); United
States v. Emmanuel, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48510, at *37-38 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
230 Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 433-36.
231 Id. at438.
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official immunity, it is perhaps most plausible to conclude that
Congress was not thinking in terms of criminal jurisdiction at all.
As the section below will discuss, like with official immunity,
criminal prosecutions of one state in the courts of another were not
a problem at the time of enactment.23 2 Indeed, the famous "Tate
Letter" from the State Department's legal advisor, which outlined
the change from a policy of granting absolute immunity to foreign
states in U.S. courts to granting restrictive immunity and which
has served as the cornerstone of U.S. policy in this area, speaks in
terms of commercial activities and foreign trade, stating "the
Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on
the party of governments of engaging in commercial activities
makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing
business with them to have their right determined in the courts."233
The implication of this language is that the State Department was
only referring to civil actions because they were the primary
concern at that time.
The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to methods of
statutory construction,23 and so the fact that the FSIA was
construed in one way in Samantar does not mean that it must be
construed similarly in other cases regarding its coverage.
Samantar's logic regarding the FSIA's coverage, however, has
powerful resonance in the debate over its criminal coverage.
Samantar shows that the FSIA is not as exclusive as once thought
and that it may be strictly construed by courts to exclude even the
most logical interpretations. 23 5 Also, Samantar can teach lessons
about whether it is desirable for a court, as opposed to a
legislature, to resolve such a key question, without leaving a
comprehensive rule in its place. In the Samantar decision, the
Supreme Court suggested alternatives that might provide foreign
officials protection from suit, but none provided the coherence or
clarity that the FSIA once did.236 Since the decision's issuance,
232 See infra Part V.B-C.
233 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Dep't of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Att'y Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 985.
234 Alex Kardon, Damages Under the Privacy Act: Sovereign Immunity and a Call
for Legislative Reform, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 705, 726-27 (2011).
235 See Samantar v. Yousuf 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290-91 (2010).
236 Id. at 2291-92.
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commentators have also set forth different views on whether the
executive should resume control of official immunity
interpretations, whether courts should develop a body of common
law on their own, or whether courts should turn to other
procedural devices to resolve the issue.237 Therefore, Samantar
teaches not only a method for resolving ambiguities, but also
offers a cautionary tale about doing so without proffering an
alternative.
This lack of clarity or certainty as to the rule governing
immunity may be more dangerous in the criminal context than in
the civil, because in the criminal context issues of personal liberty
or moral culpability may be at stake. Criminal law in the United
States and around the world is, in many respects, designed to
increase certainty as to what conduct will beget punishment.23 8 A
237 Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar, Official Immunity, and Federal Common Law, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 589, 597 (2011) ("While Samantar deserves some nominal
praise for resolving the immediate circuit split, the decision is deeply unsatisfying. The
theoretical underpinnings of this exercise of federal common law power are woefully
underdeveloped. Moreover, even assuming that the court properly exercised its
common-law power in this setting, the decisions leaves unanswered a host of questions
about the scope of individual immunity and its relationship between that immunity and
the FSIA's framework. Finally, the decision renews (but does not resolve) the old wars
over the proper branch of government to control the immunity determination. In these
respects, Samantar may have well have unleashed more doctrinal problems than it
resolved.").
238 See Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental
Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 468-70 (2003-2004) (discussing mechanisms for
increasing certainty in areas of criminal law). The authors explained:
There are many rules in criminal law that are explicitly designed to address
uncertainty with respect to the size of a sanction. These rules follow in part
from the fundamental principle that an individual is entitled to know in advance
the content of criminal prohibitions as well as the sanctions for violating them.
The prohibition on retroactive changes in the criminal sanctions provides a
paradigmatic example. International documents, such as Section 11(2) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Section 7(1) of the European
Convention of Human Rights, prohibit the imposition of retroactive sanctions
for new offenses, or retroactively increasing the sanctions for existing offenses.
Similar provisions can be found in numerous constitutions, including in Article
I, Sections 9 and 10 of the United States Constitution, Article 103(2) of the
German Constitution, and in Section 11(g) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. A related principle of criminal law-the principle of lenity-
also increases the certainty of the criminal sanction. According to the principle
of lenity, a criminal statute must be strictly construed and any doubt regarding
the size of the sanction must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Finally, one
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decision by a court that terminates any link between the FSIA and
criminal immunity, offering nothing more than some vague
guidance for future cases, would strike at the heart of this rule of
certainty.
V. Resolving Ambiguities
A. The General Debate
The above analysis is not intended to be exhaustive, nor
entirely conclusive on the issue of what type of amendment to
adopt to clarify the FSIA's treatment of criminal jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, three issues should be apparent. First, there is no
clear indication that the FSIA was meant to confer or deny
immunity for crimes. Second, there is nothing in a criminal act
per se that disqualifies it from being otherwise commercial for
purposes of a civil suit under the FSIA and nothing that similarly
disqualifies it from forming the basis for other tests under the
FSIA, for example, by way of the expropriation or discretionary
exemption under the tort provision. Third, the FSIA provides no
guidance on how to separate criminal acts, as courts have done, as
being of a certain nature (i.e., particularly heinous or destructive)
such that they are disqualified under the FSIA from constituting,
for example, commercial behavior, or a valid exercise of official
discretion.
On some level, the FSIA's exceptions were meant to permit
litigation against a foreign state and its instrumentalities that any
ordinary person could bring against another.239 To exclude
behavior that is, in another dimension, criminal would ferociously
undercut the scope of those provisions and the purpose of the
FSIA, leaving private litigants with no civil recourse for a number
of contractual violations and tortuous acts because they might also
be criminal.2 4 0 An amendment to clarify this generally might be
of the stated objectives of the Model Penal Code has been "to give fair warning
of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on conviction of an offense."
Id.
239 See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439-40
(1989) ("Congress' primary purpose in enacting § 1605(a)(5) was to eliminate a foreign
state's immunity for traffic accidents and other torts committed in the United
States. .. .").
240 See id; see also Alder v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 875 (2000)
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prudent, but not altogether necessary, especially if FSIA is
amended to clarify that it does not include criminal jurisdiction. If
it becomes clear that the FSIA has no bearing on criminal actions,
then it may become easier to conclude that the FSIA does not
exclude civil actions based on illegal acts.
Nor is an amendment to the FSIA concerning the third
dilemma, to clarify when criminal conduct is so destructive that it
loses its commercial nature or is so heinous that it cannot be
discretionary, entirely necessary. The FSIA already contains a
definition of commercial conduct that courts have adapted to suit
cases in which the criminality of otherwise commercial conduct is
at issue,24 and these questions are best left to courts to determine
on a more fact-specific basis by developing and refining their own
tests. That approach avoids forcing Congress to make any
unnecessarily awkward policy decisions regarding whether sex-
trafficking can be commercial in nature or whether knowingly
removing consular personnel before they can be criminally
prosecuted for, e.g., child molestation, can be an exempt
discretionary act by a high-ranking consular official.
With regard to the question of criminal jurisdiction itself, a
clarifying amendment or a separate statute is needed. Coverage of
criminal behavior is the primary issue affecting all of the debates
described above. In drafting an amendment, Congress should
consider several areas of background information.
B. International Law
The FSIA codified international law at the time of its
enactment as to the immunity of states and their subdivisions from
the civil jurisdiction of U.S. courts.2 42 Therefore, Congress must
consider the state of international law regarding municipal or
domestic criminal prosecutions of foreign sovereigns or immunity-
derivative institutions associated with them; how that state of
international law is, if at all, interpreted or reflected in our own
("A contract for services is plainly commercial in nature. The fact that the contract was
for an illegal purpose .. . does nothing to destroy its commercial nature.").
241 See, e.g., Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2002); Alder,
219 F.3d 869; Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 198 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 1999);
Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 750 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
242 Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 195, 199
(2007).
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present law; and how the state of international law is changing or
evolving and the implications this should have on any amendment.
Criminal prosecutions of foreign states and associated entities
in the courts of other countries typically have long been seen as
contrary to international law.243  The United Nations Convention
on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property,
which tracks many of the exceptions to immunity that are
contained in the FSIA, appears to be solely civil in nature, and the
General Assembly understands it as such.24 4 Foreign sovereign
immunity statutes of other nations with common law systems,
including the United Kingdom,2 45  Canada, 246 Australia,2 47  and
243 The absolute immunity of states, at least concerning prosecutions of heads of
state and diplomatic ministers, was confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, which involved a warrant for arrest of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo by Belgian authorities, pursuant to their
universal jurisdiction statute for crimes against humanity. Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 1, 51-61 (Feb. 14). The ICJ
observed that "in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and
consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as Head of State,
Head of Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction
in other States both civil and criminal." Id $ 51. In a 2009 Resolution on the Immunity
from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons who Act on Behalf of the State in Case of
International Crimes by the Institute of International Law, those involved in the debate
could not agree on the assimilation of an exception to the immunity rationae materiae
(or conduct based immunity) for grave human rights violations by officials. See Annyssa
Bellal, The 2009 Resolution of the Institute of International Law on Immunity and
International Crimes: A Partial Codification of the Law, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 227,
239-41 (2011) (describing the debate). In other words, if officials cannot obtain
immunity for heinous acts, states should not be able to, either. Id. But, even as the
debate is described, it concerns immunity from the civil jurisdiction of foreign courts for
foreign states themselves. Id.; see also, Inst. of Int'l L., Third Commission, Resolution
on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the
State in Case of International Crimes, arts. II-IV (2009) [hereinafter Resolution on
Immunity], available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2009 naples 01 en.pdf,
ELEANOR WYLLS ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS
15 (1933) (referring to exceptions from immunity as suits by private parties against state-
associated entities but not noting any similar exception for criminal prosecutions).
244 G.A. Res. 59/38 at 4, U.N. Doc. AIRES/59/38 (Dec. 16, 2004) (noting that the
Convention does not apply to criminal proceedings).
245 State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 16(4) (noting that the part of the act applying
to proceedings against a state in the United Kingdom does not apply to criminal
proceedings).
246 State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18 ("This Act does not apply to criminal
proceedings or proceedings in the nature of criminal proceedings.").
247 Foreign State Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) pt.1, s.3 (Austl.) (explaining that
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Singapore, 248 also expressly indicate that their restrictive immunity
provisions are meant to apply to civil cases.
One possible reason for the difference between civil and
criminal jurisdiction is that a criminal indictment is a harsher
commentary on an entity-it is, as noted commentator Hazel Fox
states, a "moral" condemnation.24 9 It denigrates the equality and
dignity of the foreign state within the international order by
criminally prosecuting it in the courts of a co-equal sovereign.2 50
Avoiding insults to the "dignity" of the sovereign or quasi-
sovereign states is a longtime rationale supporting the maintenance
of sovereign immunity in the United States.25 ' Suits against the
state are particularly distasteful to courts when litigants ask them,
in some sense, to regulate or comment on the public governmental
activity of a foreign state.252 The court in Mitsui noted, without
specific citation, that foreign sovereigns do not normally sue each
other in peacetime,2 53 presumably referring to suits concerning the
actions of sovereigns acting in their public capacity. The Mitsui
court did not acknowledge, however, that an agency of a foreign
state could act just as any other private party in a corporate
transaction and commit a crime in that context as well.
A second reason for this immunity might be international
comity.
"Comity" in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. Rather, it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding "means a proceeding in a court but does not include a prosecution for an
offence or an appeal or other proceeding in the nature of an appeal in relation to such a
prosecution.").
248 Singapore State Immunity Act Pt. II § 19(2) (1985) (indicating expressly that its
provisions do not apply to criminal proceedings).
249 Fox, 2nd ed.,supra note 41, at 87.
250 See Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 866 (2008)
(observing that "[t]here is a comity interest in allowing a foreign state to use its own
courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. The dignity of a foreign state is not
enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without right or good cause.").
251 Id. at 865-66.
252 Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 750 F. Supp. 838, 838 (N.D. Ohio
1990).
253 Id. at 843.
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acts of another nation, having due regard to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other
person who are under the protection of its laws.254
Courts in one country may fear that the instrumentalities of their
own nation could be retaliated against and indicted abroad if they
permit similar suits-what Posner and Sunstein refer to in another
context as part of the "entanglement" theory in foreign affairs.25 5
If a nation, such as the United States, were to adopt a form of
restrictive criminal immunity, there would be a concern that a
foreign state might act purely out of retaliation and prosecute U.S.
entities and officials unreasonably. Sunstein and Posner argue that
these entanglement concerns must be weighed against the benefits
of advancing certain U.S. interests-here, the enforcement of
criminal law in an equal and just manner.2 56  Furthermore,
guidance from the executive might alleviate some concern by
showing courts that the State Department is not concerned and that
diplomatic considerations would prevent a foreign state from
acting purely out of retaliation. The next Section of this Article
will explore the use of the executive in ameliorating comity-
related concerns in additional detail.
Despite this near absolute criminal immunity, exceptions have
emerged to the rule of absolute criminal immunity of foreign states
through doctrines such as universal and international criminal
254 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
255 Eric A. Posner & Cass Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1170, 1184-85 (2007) [hereinafter Posner & Sunstein] (discussing the
entanglement theory of international comity: "The entanglement theory suggests that
international comity doctrines reduce the risk that courts will inadvertently cause foreign
policy tensions or crises by offending other nations.... The common theme is that a
court might inadvertently increase international tensions or, in the extreme case, even
provoke an international crisis by offending or injuring a foreign nation. That nation
might then retaliate against the United States, for example, by withdrawing its
participation in a vital area of international cooperation or directing its own courts to
commit similar offenses against the United States.").
256 Id. at 1186 ("[C]ourts should consider at least three factors when resolving cases
with foreign relations implications: (1) an empirical determination or conjecture (a) that
the foreign state is likely to reciprocate or (b) that it would otherwise retaliate in some
way if the court ignored its interests; (2) a judgment that the benefits of reciprocation or
nonretaliation by foreign states exceed the costs of deference to the foreign interests; and
(3) an additional judgment about whether deference has systemic or rule of law benefits
or disadvantages for the United States.").
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jurisdiction.25 7 International criminal jurisdiction is vested, on a
multilateral level, in the International Criminal Court (ICC), which
is the product of a treaty. 25 Despite its rocky beginning,
particularly with regard to problems of acceptance by the United
States, the ICC has grown as an institution capable of handling
important cases involving the violation of international law by
high profile leaders. For example, in 2011, as a vote of confidence
in the ICC, the U.N. Security Council charged it with handling the
criminal investigation of atrocities committed in Libya.259  This
marked the first time that the Security Council had voted
unanimously to refer a case to the ICC, and for the United States,
this was also the first vote of referral to the ICC.2 60 Current State
Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh has recently described the
once tenuous relationship between the United States and the ICC
as changing from "hostility to positive engagement.",2 6 1
Certainly the most famous example of a criminal proceeding
before a domestic court is the extradition proceedings in Britain of
Augusto Pinochet for torture and crimes against humanity. A
Spanish court requested extradition for crimes against Spanish
citizens and Chilean citizens allegedly authorized by Pinochet on
Chilean soil.2 62  On appeal from the divisional court, in three
highly-watched decisions, the British House of Lords ultimately
concluded that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity for acts of torture
committed after Chile and Britain had ratified the U.N. Torture
Convention.26 3 While distinguishable on many grounds, and not
necessarily embodying a generally applicable rule, the Pinochet
decisions suggest that there may be some cracks in the armor of
foreign state criminal immunity before domestic courts.
Nearly 150 years before Pinochet, New York courts rejected
the immunity defense in a trial for murder and arson for the raid of
257 See, e.g., Resolution on Immunity, supra note 270, arts. II-IV; Fox, 2nd ed.,
supra note 41 at 87-92; Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 38, at 2159-60.
258 Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 2.
259 John R. Crook, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 568, 569-72 (2011).
260 Id. at 570.
261 Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser's Office: Eight
Decades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1770 (2012).
262 Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 38, at 2146-48.
263 Id.
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the U.S. ship, the Caroline, by Alexander McLeod.26 4 McLeod
argued that he was entitled to release because the British
government had ratified his actions, but the court disagreed,
concluding that Britain's approbations did nothing to the
criminality of the act.265 In the context of the Samantar decision,
McLeod's case has been cited by those scholars arguing for less
immunity for former and current officials who are defendants in
suits for human rights offenses, 266 but McLeod also shows the
deep roots of the prerogative of national tribunals to prosecute
even those expressly disclaimed as acting under orders from
foreign sovereigns.2 67
Hazel Fox notes that the pervasive use of the restrictive theory
of immunity around the world might effect a change or shift away
from the old absolute immunity from private criminal prosecution,
and in the case of an entity, regardless of whether it is a civil or
criminal case, the compensation and the penalty can often be the
same: a monetary sum. 2 68 A recent report on state immunity from
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
recognizes Fox's theory that criminal monetary sanctions against
state entities may be acceptable under a theory of restrictive
immunity, and distills factors that would counsel in favor of an
exception from immunity for state-controlled enterprises in
criminal proceedings, namely: "the limitation of remedies to
compensatory type remedies; the commercial nature of the
transaction; and a strong jurisdictional (territorial) connection of
the events with the forum state."2 69
264 People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
265 Id. at 581-604.
266 See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Modern Common Law of Official Immunity, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2676 (2011).
267 See also Horn v. Mitchell, 223 F. 549, 552 (D. Mass. 1915), affd, 232 F. 819,
822-24 (1st Cir. 1916) (finding no immunity for criminal prosecution of German solider
accused of tampering with explosives, as the United States was not yet part of World
War I). Cf Bederman, Cautionary Tale, supra note 210, at 527-28 (discussing the
enactment of a portion of the habeas statute that deals with foreign sovereign
compulsion, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4) and its limitations).
268 Fox, 2nd ed., supra note 41, at 87-97.
269 David Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government
Controlled Investors 29 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Working Paper on
International Investment No. 2, 2010).
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Despite these exceptions, domestic criminal prosecutions of
foreign states and their entities remain relatively unheard of, and
any changes have been mainly in the area of criminal prosecutions
of natural persons, not states or their associated entities. 270 n
addition, of course, international law has recognized special
immunities from criminal prosecution for diplomats and consular
officers. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
diplomatic agents and their family members are immune from the
criminal jurisdiction of signatories' courts.2 7' Other staff
associated with their mission may be immune from criminal
prosecution for acts taken in the course of their duties.2 72 Under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, consular personnel
are immune from arrest and detention pending trial, but they are
only immune from the criminal jurisdiction of courts in cases
wherein the prosecution is based on acts performed in the exercise
of consular functions.2 73
C. U.S. Interpretation ofInternational Law
The United States has developed its own practices and
interpretations of international law relevant to whether of
restrictive criminal immunity might emerge .274 Three general
principles, distilled from various sources, may be helpful in
resolving the issue of whether one should ever grant criminal
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. First is the rule reflected in
the famous case of Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon " in which
Justice Marshall described the absolute rights of sovereigns in
270 See generally Stephens, supra note 266, at 2675 ("[M]ost claims of foreign
official immunity in U.S. courts involve the specialized immunities granted to diplomats
and consuls by international treaties or the common law immunity afforded to
recognized heads of state. Cases against other foreign government officials were rare
between the adoption of the Constitution and the late twentieth century, and ... the
scattered cases were not always consistent.").
271 DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: PRIVILEGES AND ABUSES 10-11 (Jonathon G. Carter ed.,
2011).
272 Id.
273 Id. at 12-13.
274 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.
J. 2599, 2645-47 (1997) (describing the transnational legal process, or the process by
which international law is made-through a series of interactions between states both,
internationally and domestically).
275 Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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their own borders and explained that foreign sovereign immunity
is a matter of comity and grace, but not of right.2 76 Gamal Badr
notes, "[fjor Marshall . . . the starting point was the local state's
exclusive territorial jurisdiction to which immunity was an
exception emanating from the will of the local state itself. He did
not envisage a blanket immunity for the foreign state as a general
rule, to which exceptions would be made . . . ."27 7 Although it is in
tension with the view under international law that foreign state
immunity in certain contexts is tantamount to a matter of right,27 8
Supreme Court decisions, even regarding the FSIA, have
repeatedly emphasized that foreign sovereign immunity is a matter
of prerogative of the domestic sovereign. 27 9 Following from that,
under this rule, it is arguable that the United States has the
prerogative to prosecute entities and individuals connected with
foreign sovereigns for violations of our own criminal laws
occurring within our territory, provided that no treaty, such as
those on diplomatic or consular relations, restrains such an action.
Second, U.S. law reflects a preference for individual
accountability for grave harms under international and domestic
law over sovereign interests in a qualified set of circumstances.
For example, the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim
Protection Act are both statutes that have generated a great deal of
litigation in U.S. courts by permitting civil suits to go forward for
the most severe violations of human rights, such as extra-judicial
killings, genocide, and torture.280 They have been utilized not only
against officials, but also now against companies, which, in
conjunction with sovereigns, have violated international law in
their conduct abroad.2 8' This is also reflected in jurisprudential
276 Id. at 137.
277 GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC
VIEW 11(1984).
278 Jasper Finke, Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity, or Something Else?, 21 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 853, 865-67 (2010) (discussing the tension between these two views of foreign
sovereign immunity).
279 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004) (noting that foreign
sovereign immunity is "a matter of grace and comity rather than a constitutional
requirement").
280 See generally Eric Engle, The Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims
Protection Act: Jurisdictional Foundations and Procedural Obstacles, 14 WILLAMETTE
J. INT'L L. & DisP. RES. 1, 2-6 (2006) (describing litigation under the two statutes).
281 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
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carve-outs from immunity for ultra vires actions of foreign or U.S.
officials, who act in violation of the law of their own country and
then seek immunity for actions committed under the color of
law.282
For violations of "clearly established" domestic law by U.S.
officials, courts have established a similar regime of qualified
immunity. 283 This is true when private litigants sue both federal
and state officials in personal capacity civil actions for violations
of civil rights.2 84 In an article by Seth Waxman and Professor
Trevor W. Morrison, the authors argued that a similar type of
qualified immunity should apply for federal agents in criminal
prosecutions by state authorities.285 Waxman and Morrison argue
that the two guideposts that should inform this inquiry are "the
federal government's interest in ensuring that States do not
interfere with federal policy and prerogatives by criminalizing the
execution of federal law, and federal officers' due process right to
fair warning before they are subjected to criminal sanction for
conduct they reasonably believed to be within their authority."2 86
Qualified immunity from criminal prosecutions would therefore
259 (2d Cir. 2009) (adopting the position that under international law, aiding and
abetting liability, the subject of civil suits under the Alien Tort Statute, requires intention
or purpose).
282 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994); Trajano v.
Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d
1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010);
United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1986); Doe v. Liu Qi,
349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1282 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Caribri v. Assasie-Gyimay, 921 F. Supp.
1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
283 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (articulating a standard for
qualified immunity).
284 See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 914-15 (1997) ("We have recognized a
qualified immunity defense for both federal officials sued under the implied cause of
action asserted in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct.
1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971), and state officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In both
situations, 'officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.')
(citation omitted).
285 Seth Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal
Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L. J. 2195, 2201
(2003).
286 Id.
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protect federal enforcement and federal official discretion, while
permitting punishment where the federal official objectively
exceeds his or her reasonable authority-i.e., in the worst cases.287
The prosecution of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, former head of
the IMF, for allegations of rape merits consideration here. Not
much more need be said about the substance of the allegations
save that Strauss-Kahn was indicted by a New York grand jury for
forced sexual acts on a female member of a hotel's housekeeping
staff while he was staying in New York.28 8 As commentators on
the affair recognized, and ultimately the State Department
agreed,289 it was problematic for Strauss-Kahn to seek immunity
under applicable treaties relating to the IMF or under U.S. law
protecting diplomats, in part because Strauss-Kahn was not acting
in any sort of official capacity when he allegedly committed the
acts in question.2 90 Moreover, he actually resigned from his
position as IMF chief following the allegations, thereby removing
287 See id. at 2202.
288 See Howard Schneider & Brady Dennis, Strauss-Kahn Indicted in Sexual
Assault, WASH. POST (May 19, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/strauss-kahn-indicted-in-sexual-
assault/2011/05/19/AF34MP7G story.html ("A New York grand jury has indicted
former International Monetary Fund managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn on
charges arising from the alleged sexual assault of a hotel maid last week, but a judge
agreed Thursday that he could await trial in a New York apartment after posting $1
million in bail and agreeing to electronic monitoring.").
289 See No Diplomatic Immunity for Strauss-Kahn, CBS NEWS (May 19, 2011),
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/19/earlyshow/main20064255.shtml.
290 See Duncan Hollis, What Kind of Immunity Does the IMF Managing Director
Have?, OPINIO JURIS (May 15, 2012, 10:51 A.M.),
http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/15/what-kind-of-immunity-does-the-imf-managing-
director-have/; Chimene Keitner, Why has DSK Not Yet Asserted Immunity? Because He
Can't, OPINIO JURIS (May 17, 2011, 1:35 P.M.), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/17/why-
has-dsk-not-yet-asserted-immunity-because-he-can%E2%80%99t/; see also Perez
Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1962) ("Appellant's acts
constituting the financial crimes of embezzlement or malversation, fraud or breach of
trust, and receiving money or valuable securities knowing them to have been unlawfully
obtained as to which probable cause of guilt had been shown were not acts of Venezuela
sovereignty. Judge Whitehurst found that each of these acts was 'for the private
financial benefit' of the appellant. They constituted common crimes committed by the
Chief of State done in violation of his position and not in pursuance of it. They are as far
from being an act of state as rape which appellant concedes would not be an 'Act of
State."').
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any protection the status of his position might have provided.29 ' in
the end, none of that mattered because weaknesses in the
prosecution's case, namely inconsistent statements by the victim,
caused the district attorney to drop the case.292 Another claim of
diplomatic immunity was also rejected in a subsequent civil case
brought by Mr. Strauss-Kahn's accuser.29 3
The Strauss-Kahn case is an imperfect example in this context,
because the defendant was not part of a foreign state in any real
sense. He was not the French president, nor was he a French
official. Either type of post would have likely entitled him to
immunity not only for his official actions, but also probably for his
personal actions, similar to the immunity that is accorded to
diplomats.2 94 The case is, however, an important example because
it shows how someone nearly as high-profile as a foreign president
could be prosecutedfairly for the commission of a violent crime in
the United States that is completely unrelated to his position or the
execution of his official duties. Specifically, even though it was
not the case for Mr. Strauss-Kahn, his circumstances show how
procedural due process and prosecutorial discretion could
intervene in another case to ensure that a retaliatory or politically
motivated criminal prosecution would not ultimately succeed. In
addition, the failure to prosecute Mr. Strauss-Kahn would have
likely resulted in heavy public outcry over exceptionalism in the
application of U.S. criminal law.2 95 For example, one could also
see a similar outcry arising over a state-owned corporation's
exemption from our criminal law pertaining to environmental
protection or food and drug production and distribution.
291 Diallo v. Strauss-Kahn, No. 307065/11, 2012 WL 1533179, at *10 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 1, 2012).
292 See John Eligon, Strauss-Kahn Drama Ends with Short Final Scene, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/nyregion/charges-against-strauss-
kahn-dismissed.html?pagewanted=alI (discussing the dismissal of Mr. Strauss-Kahn's
charges).
293 See Tamer El Ghobashy, Strauss-Kahn's Immunity Claim is Rejected in Maid's
Civil Suit, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2012, at Al1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303916904577377982338104506.html.
294 See Michael Ross, Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A Review of Remedial
Approaches to Address the Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 4 AM. U. J.
INT'L POL'Y & L. 173, 173-75 (1989).
295 Joseph F. Morrisey, Simplifying FSIA: If a Sovereign Acts Like a Private Party,
Then Treat It Like One, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 675, 679-81 (2005).
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In the civil case against Mr. Strauss-Kahn, a New York State
court has already denied him absolute immunity, which his
attorneys argued exists under the U.N. Convention on Specialized
Agencies and customary international law. 2 96 The court sided with
the plaintiff, noting that the U.S. International Organizations
Immunity Act (IOIA) and other relevant international conventions
provide immunity only for official acts.29 7 In a passage that
illustrates the intersection between domestic interests in the fight
against violent crime, international interests in reciprocity and
foreign relations, and the crossover interest in avoiding situations
in which immunity becomes impunity for no functional reason, the
court stated:
Thus, the IOIA, with its official acts immunity, not
customary international law, controls the nature of the
immunity relative to Mr. Strauss-Kahn. The United States
of America, through its political processes can make laws,
ratify treaties or issue judicial pronouncements which
require a non-citizen employee of a specialized agency,
here on our soil as part of the fabric of international
governance, to behave, in their private conduct in a lawful
way failing which to be answerable in courts of law or
other tribunals under the same standards as their next door
American neighbors. At a time when issues concerning
human rights significantly shape today's international law,
customary or otherwise, it is hardly an assault on long
standing principles of comity among nations to require
those working in this country to respect our laws as
Americans working elsewhere must respect theirs.29 8
The above passage also calls to light the other significance of
the Strauss-Kahn case for purposes of this discussion: the way in
which certain grave abuses of diplomatic immunity-a procedure
meant to protect diplomats and their families from undue
interference from the host state-could alternatively proceed if
such blanket immunity did not exist. In cases involving rape,
assault, or slavery by those protected by personal and official
diplomatic immunity from criminal prosecution, commentators
296 See Diallo, 2012 WL 1533179, at *4-5, *9-10.
297 Id. at *9-10.
298 Id
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have complained that the State Department has acted in a less than
transparent manner to affect broad grants of diplomatic immunity
from police investigation or prosecution for violent crime.299 As it
stands right now, the State Department has less than satisfying
options for seeking to apply criminal law to those acts perpetrated
in abuse of diplomatic immunity. It has considered compensating
the victims of diplomatic crimes, but noted that the problem of
uncompensated victims of crimes by diplomatic agents was not
significant enough to justify the burden of establishing that type of
fund.300 At most, a diplomat suspected of a crime may be
deported, which the Department views as an "extreme diplomatic
tool."30 1 In some ways, this is worse for the innocently accused
than is prosecution. In a fair trial, diplomats are permitted to clear
their name in a country with standards of criminal due process and
where all of the relevant evidence is located. Although a jury
never formally acquitted Mr. Strauss-Kahn, his reputation
arguably suffered less because the prosecution had to drop a weak
case. It likely would have been even more damaging if U.S.
authorities had permitted him to flee the country without
answering the charges at all.
Third, even when grave harms to human rights are not
involved, the United States has long maintained a commitment to
the basic principle of restrictive immunity,30 2 which the FSIA and
299 Ross, supra note 294, at 174-75, 186-88 (discussing specific cases in which the
State Department halted police investigations involving grants of diplomatic immunity).
In a 2010 Second Circuit case, Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123 (2d. Cir. 2010), the
Second Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling denying residual diplomatic immunity to
former diplomats of the Kuwait mission to the United Nations in a civil suit for atrocious
acts committed against an in-home domestic worker. Id. at 128. The defendants were
accused of committing acts of psychological abuse, physical battery, and multiple rapes.
Id at 128-29. This was the second lawsuit in the matter; the first was dismissed by the
Southern District in New York in 2002 because the then-current diplomat defendants had
immunity. Id. at 130. The plaintiff waited eight years for a U.S. appellate court to
permit consideration of the merits of her case. Id.
300 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT ON THE NEED AND FEASIBILITY OF
COMPENSATION PROGRAM FOR THE VICTIMS OF DIPLOMATIC CRIMES 12-13 (1991),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/28498.pdf.
301 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DIPLOMATIC &
CONSULAR IMMUNITY: GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT & JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES 13
(2011).
302 See Diallo v. Strauss-Kahn, No. 307065/11, 2012 WL 1533179, at *24, *7-9
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 1, 2012).
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other domestic practices embody. In a line of cases predating the
more official commitment to restrictive immunity by the State
Department through the Tate Letter and ultimately by Congress
with the enactment of the FSIA, the restrictive principle was
developed.3 03 In that case, which involved foreign sovereign
immunity, the district court compared Justice Marshall's language
in the Schooner case, noting the difference between a prince's
private property and a foreign nation's public property, with
Marshall's language in another case regarding the state of
Georgia's private commercial interests in a corporation.30 4 This
comparison is useful in showing that Marshall was thinking in
terms of restrictive immunity, at that time, for suits against a
foreign state, even though Schooner has come to be cited for the
principle of absolute immunity of foreign states.3 05 The language
from Justice Marshall was:
It is, we think, a sound principle that when a government
becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself,
so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its
sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen.
Instead of communicating to the company its privileges
and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with
whom it associates itself, and takes the character which
belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be
transacted.306
This idea has been borne out with respect to certain entities
associated with our own federal government. As with many states
around the world,307 the creation of federally chartered
corporations, banks, and non-profits (e.g., Red Cross) has come in
waves.30 8 In some statutes, Congress has described these federally
303 See Morrisey, supra note 295, at 679-81.
304 James v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 471 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237-38 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
305 Morrisey, supra note 295, at 680.
306 The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (quoting Bank of U.S. v. Planters'
Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. 904, 906-07 (1824)).
307 See, e.g., Pier Angelo Toninelli, The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprise: The
Framework, in THE RISE AND FALL OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN
WORLD 3, 14-22 (Pier Angelo Toninelli ed. 2000).
308 See Paul E. Leud, Federal Chartered Corporations and Federal Jurisdiction, 36
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 317, 323-26 (2009) (describing waves of creation).
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chartered corporations as "private" or as lacking federal
instrumentality status.3 09  Jurisprudence on whether and when
these entities are subject to state law and regulation has not been a
model of clarity. "For the most part," Professor Lund notes,
"federal business corporations are subject to the general laws-
tort, contract, and otherwise-in the states in which they conduct
business."3"o To put it more concretely, while the federal
government is immune from suit absent the consent of Congress
under most circumstances," certain federal instrumentalities may
be sued and subject to state regulation so long as the action or
prosecution (as a form of regulation) does not interfere with their
federal function.3 1 2 Therefore, roughly stated, government-owned
entities performing a private, non-governmental function should
theoretically receive no immunity.313
And, in the foreign sovereign immunity context, the Supreme
Court has affirmed this idea:
When the foreign state enters the marketplace or when it acts as
a private party, there is no justification in modem international
law for allowing the foreign state to avoid the economic costs
of... the accidents which it may cause. . . the law should not
permit the foreign state to shift these everyday burdens of the
marketplace to private parties.3 The public/private distinction
309 Id. at 324.
310 Id. at 325.
311 See Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the United
States cannot be sued absent consent and thus concluding that "it is self-evident that a
federal agency is not subject to state or federal criminal prosecution"). Cf Margaret K.
Minister, Federal Facilities and the Deterrence Failure of Environmental Laws: The
Case for Criminal Prosecution of Federal Employees, 18 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 137,
157-163 (1994) (discussing difficulties holding federal facilities accountable in state
criminal prosecutions despite arguable statutory authorization for such prosecutions).
312 James v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 471 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237-38 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (concluding that a federal reserve bank would not have immunity from state fair
employment laws because they do not interfere with the bank's federal function).
313 See Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The test for
determining whether an entity is a federal instrumentality for purposes of protection from
state or local action or taxation, however, is very broad: whether the entity performs an
important governmental function."); see also Amtrak Tries to Stop Prosecution, EUGENE
REGISTER GUARD, Sept. 22, 1989, at 3B (explaining that the Florida State Attorney
argued that Amtrak could try to escape civil regulatory actions by states, but not criminal
charges for violating state dumping laws regarding refuse on the tracks).
314 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 366 n.2 (1993) (White, J., concurring in
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at the heart of restrictive immunity consistently animates U.S.
law and policy in the area of sovereign immunity.315
The principal of restrictive immunity is also embodied in
federal common law governing foreign state liability in the form
of the Bancec presumption, which derives from the case of First
National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba
(Bancec).3 16 The primary issue in Bancec was whether a
counterclaim against entities of the Cuban government for
expropriation of foreign bank property should be dismissed in
pending commercial litigation originally between City Bank and a
dissolved bank of the Cuban government, i.e., Bancec.317 The case
then became about whether the court should consider the bank and
the government of Cuba juridically distinct for purposes of
liability, particularly given that it seemed clear that the Cuban
government had dissolved the bank to avoid commercial
obligations."' On the basis of common principles of international
and federal common law, the Court held that unless a requisite
degree of control is established between a foreign state and its
instrumentality or unless considering them separate would create
an injustice, an instrumentality of a foreign state will be presumed
to be juridically distinct from the foreign state itself for purposes
of liability." 9 The Bancec presumption reinforces the distinction
judgment) (quoting Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearings on HR. 11315 before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94 th Cong., 2d Sess., 27 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser,
Department of State)), superseded by statute, 1997 Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009, 172 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1605A (Supp. II 2006)).
315 See, e.g., Nelson, 507 U.S. at 359-60 ("[A] state is immune from the jurisdiction
of foreign courts as to its sovereign or public acts (jure imperii), but not as to those that
are private or commercial in character (jure gestionis).").
316 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 615 (1983), superseded by statute, Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-297, 105 Stat. 2322 (codified at 28 U.S.C.S. § 1610 (2012)), as recognized in
Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 609 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2010).
317 Id. at 613-15.
318 See id at 622-23.
319 Id. at 633-34. Subsequent court of appeals cases have digested the presumption
in this manner, and noted further implications. See Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga
Distancia de P.R., Inc., 183 F.3d 1277, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[G]ovemment
instrumentalities enjoy a presumption of separate juridical status vis-a-vis the foreign
government to which they are related. While Bancec applied this presumption for
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between the private and public activities of the state for purposes
of liability by ensuring that the foreign state itself will not be liable
for the private commercial activities of its instrumentalities absent
exceptional circumstances. 3 20
D. Future Considerations and Guiding Questions
On the basis of the principles and rules set forth above, a
number of considerations need to be addressed in determining
what immunity from criminal prosecution should be available to
foreign states and the entities associated with them. Each of these
considerations or issues in itself could be the subject of an entire
article, and the list below is by no means exhaustive. Before
proceeding to briefly describe those considerations, one
proposition seems apparent: it would be irregular to grant states,
their instrumentalities, and their officials absolute and total
immunity from U.S. criminal laws. The modem standard under
international law and U.S. law is restrictive sovereign immunity.32 '
Some sort of restrictive immunity standard should therefore be
applied in any amendment.
purposes of determining whether an instrumentality could be held substantively liable for
the debts of its related foreign government, subsequent decisions have also applied it in
determining whether an exception to immunity that applies to the government may be
attributed to the instrumentality as well. In Bancec, the Supreme Court highlighted two
situations in which a plaintiff may overcome the presumption of separate juridical status
enjoyed by an instrumentality. First, when a corporate entity is so extensively controlled
by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created, the Court observed that
one may be held liable for the actions of the other. Second, the Court recognized the
broader equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity will not be regarded
where to do so would work fraud or injustice or defeat overriding public policies."); see
also SerVaas Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, No. 10-828-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2709, at
*5-6 (2d Cir. Feb. 16, 2011) (stating the Bancec presumption); Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2002) ("In Bancec, the government
of Cuba expropriated property from First National City Bank (subsequently known as
'Citibank'). Citibank asserted a set-off against the plaintiff Bancec based upon the
Cuban government's seizure of Citibank's Cuban assets. The Court addressed the issue
of whether the acts and liabilities of the foreign sovereign government of Cuba could be
attributed to the state-owned banking entity, Bancec."), superseded by statute, Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012)); TransAmerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela,
200 F.3d 843, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
320 See First Nat'l Citi Bank, 462 U.S. at 624-28.
321 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 451
(1987).
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Judge Joan Donoghue of the International Court of Justice has
noted that a satisfying and cohesive theory outlining the contours
of restrictive immunity has not emerged.3 22 Commentators have
suggested various approaches, such as assimilation of foreign
sovereigns into the same position of the domestic sovereign;
creation of a presumption of non-immunity; and creation of a new
standard to balance certain interests, such as adherence to
international law, plaintiffs' rights to relief in court absent
immunity, and comity concerns regarding U.S.-related entities as
defendants in foreign courts.323 In crafting the "considerations"
below, this article leans more toward what Judge Donoghue calls
this third "functional" approach,324 and it takes into account the
analysis of the features of domestic and international law
described above. The following considerations as to the contours
of restrictive criminal immunity should be significant. This list is
based, in part, on the commonly arising issues in foreign sovereign
immunity that Peter Trooboff expressed in his excellent and
comprehensive summation of the past and the future of law of
foreign state immunity over twenty years ago. 3 25
1. Defining the "Foreign State"
Assuming that some type of restrictive immunity is indeed the
standard, and that restrictive immunity means holding foreign
sovereign-associated entities accountable when the nature of their
activities is the same as that in which any other private party could
be engaged,326 then one important question is how to define the
foreign state for purposes of restrictive criminal foreign sovereign
immunity. Would that include the state itself, its subdivisions, and
its agencies and instrumentalities? Given the contours of
restrictive immunity at present it may be prudent to cover only
those entities that the state has established as essentially a private-
322 See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the Sovereign Out of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE
J. INT'L L. 489, 490-93 (1992).
323 See id.
324 Id. at 493-94.
325 Peter D.Trooboff, Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles,
200 RECUEIL DES COURS 235, 250-55 (1986).
326 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 451
(1987).
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functioning entity, such as a state-owned corporation or state-
owned foundation; this is the type of restrictive immunity that
seems to characterize treatment of instrumentalities of the U.S.
federal government.3 27  There should be no insult to foreign
sovereignty if a majority foreign-state owned corporation is
prosecuted for environmental crimes in the United States. It
would be natural then that the officers and directors of covered
foreign state-owned companies should bear criminal responsibility
just as the officers and directors of any other entity in the United
States potentially would.
Whether foreign officials generally, who are not subject to
diplomatic, consular, or some other type of immunity, should
receive immunity for crimes presents a more difficult question.
Considerations of consistency and fairness dictate that the answer
should be "no immunity" for serious violations of U.S. criminal
law, such as murder, rape, assault and drug trafficking.32 8 These
are crimes for which officials would be prosecuted in their
personal capacity because they are not, nor can they credibly be,
classified under the law as official activities. 329  The cases
described above, granting or denying immunity on the basis of the
FSIA's discretionary exemption in the tort context, provide a
useful lens through which to view this issue: violent and purely
destructive behavior that violates our criminal law is not official in
nature and does not deserve immunity. Our strong interest in
maintaining equal administration of the criminal law should tip the
scales in favor of avoiding any unproductive extensions of
immunity to cover other officials wherever possible, balanced with
foreign relations and comity considerations.
When the crime is transnational in nature or the criminal
conduct is an "international crime" within the meaning of the
Rome Statute for example, the issue is more complex and
controversial. Some prosecutions of this type will no doubt be
possible because Congress has expressly authorized them by
statute and/or pursuant to an international agreement.330 In those
327 See Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239, 1240-41 (9th Cit. 1982).
328 See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288d(b) (2006).
329 See id.
330 See United States v. Emmanuel, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48510, at *8-10 (S.D.
Fla. 2007).
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instances, immunity could be expressly removed by statute. In
other instances, comity concerns and the prevalence of civil
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute as a substitute may (to the
extent that it remains one) at times tip the scales in favor of only
covering crimes committed within the territorial borders of the
United States. The consequences of making a distinction of this
type, including the harm to various international and foreign
policy interests, balanced seriously against the interest of our own
citizens in the deterrent effects of violent and destructive crime
both domestically and internationally, will deserve serious
consideration in any policy choice.
2. Coverage of Particular Crimes
For which crimes, federal or state, will covered entities be
subject to punishment? It seems less possible to restrict criminal
prosecutions by placing them into broad categories, as the FSIA
does with civil claims."' Instead, perhaps the rule of thumb
should be that the criminal prosecution, regardless of the crime,
should go forward provided that it does not interfere with any
public function of the foreign state-owned entity, excepting
circumstances in which a multilateral or bilateral instrument to
which the United States is a party states otherwise, or rather
provided that covered entities should only bear responsibility
when their conduct is entirely private in nature. Although these
standards are not the model of clarity, any statutory enactment
could draw upon the wealth of jurisprudence in the civil context
for analogies and, more importantly, lessons learned.
3. The Role of the Executive
Given the close connection between the imposition of criminal
liability and concerns about damage to foreign relations or
international comity concerns,33 2 Congress should be clear about
the role and powers ascribed to the Executive in whatever
instrument it adopts. Separation of powers debates may not lend
themselves to generally applicable abstractions on this point,"
331 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (2006 & Supp.
2010).
332 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 255, at 1184-85.
333 See Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY
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and are beyond the scope of this brief discussion. However, in a
more practical sense, it seems clear that given the history of
foreign sovereign immunity determinations in the United States, 33 4
and the sensitivity of criminal prosecutions under international
law, if the United States were to adopt a restrictive standard
embodied in a piece of legislation, the Executive Branch should
have some degree of input, even if only in a discrete class of cases.
In the aftermath of Samantar, the State Department made a
determination of no immunity to which the district court
ultimately deferred.3 " There have been various proposals about
what degree of deference to accord to executive determinations
regarding immunity, some questioning its lawmaking authority36
and others calling for a type of Chevron style administrative
deference.3 37 Although the State Department may be exempt from
certain portions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
itself,338 if it is to engage in a conclusive determination regarding
the criminal immunity of a party to a prosecution in court, that
procedure should embody the spirit of our administrative law, i.e.,
the Department's determination must be (1) reviewable in some
way and (2) subject to some sort of basic requirements of
transparency and regularity which are innate values in nearly all
aspects of our legal system.
4. Establishing Appropriate Punishments
The punishments to which covered entities may be subjected
must be carefully considered. Restriction of the liberty of officers
associated with these entities will be controversial, as will criminal
L. REV. 343, 343-44 (1989) (arguing that a "rigid" separation of the functions of the
branches ignores the realities of government).
334 Prior to the adoption of the FSIA, these determinations were made by the State
Department and were for all intents and purposes considered binding by the courts. See
Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 90 (1943), superseded by statute, Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11(2006), as recognized in
Chuidian v. Philippine Nat. Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990).
335 Yousuf v. Samantar, 1:04cv1360 (LMB/JPA) (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011) (order
accepting the State Departments suggestion of no immunity for defendant).
336 See Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts:
The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 922-24 (2011).
337 See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV.
650, 651-52 (2000).
338 See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 128.1 (2012).
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and civil forfeiture or seizure of the foreign state's assets. Several
characteristics of the FSIA will be relevant considerations for
policymakers. First, the FSIA itself provides a broader immunity
from the execution of judgments against a foreign state than it
does for jurisdiction of those suits.339 Thus courts have noted that
it forces them into the awkward compromise of providing for a
right without a remedy under some conditions.340 This is also, if
not more so, an undesirable incongruence for the criminal sphere.
All crimes should have a punishment. Second, the FSIA provides
for broader immunity from execution against the assets of a
foreign state than it does for the assets of an agency or
instrumentality.34 1 The latter's assets may be attached to satisfy a
judgment even though they are not specifically involved in the
transaction over which the court has jurisdiction.34 2 The property
of central banks and military property is specially protected.34 3
The availability for attachment of the assets of associated entities
is broader when an action is brought under the FSIA provisions
remedying state-sponsored terrorism.3 44 Finally, although the
FSIA is silent on the issue of injunctive relief, courts have still
issued injunctions without concern for violating the Act.345 Once
again, with these restrictions, it is evident that Congress walked a
fine line between protecting property more commonly associated
with the public functions of the state (perhaps more likely to be in
the hands of the foreign state itself or its central bank)34 6 and
property commonly associated with the private commercial
activities of the foreign state.347
All of these considerations will have to be reformulated and
339 See Walters v. Indus. & Commer. Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d
Cir. 2011).
340 See id.
341 Id. at 289-90.
342 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (2006). See also BADR,
supra note 277, at 131 (describing the FSIA's execution scheme and comparing it to that
of other states).
343 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, § 1611 (2006).
344 See Calderon-Cardona v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 11 Civ. 3283 (DLC),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143011, at *42-45 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,2011).
345 DELLAPENNA, supra note 43, at 736-37.
346 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, § 1611(b).
347 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
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considered in light of the civil and criminal forfeiture regimes.
Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding against an actual piece of
property involved in criminal activity, which takes place
regardless of the innocence or guilt of the property owner.34 8
Criminal forfeiture occurs as a punishment once there has been a
conviction on the basis of criminal charges in court.349 It does not
treat the property as the defendant, although third party claims to
the property may still be considered and prevail in certain
circumstances. 350 The core concern in thinking through these
issues will be whether the financial interests and property of the
foreign state are tangentially implicated in a transaction in which it
has not taken part as a private party; that is, the concern that
animates the FSIA's restriction on execution against the
commercial transaction property of the foreign state that is not the
basis for the claim at issue. This concern about suits that implicate
the interests of otherwise immune sovereigns was at the center of
the Supreme Court's decision in Republic of the Philippines v.
Pimentel,3 5 1 in which the Court concluded that if a sovereign is a
necessary party to a dispute then that case is subject to dismissal if
the party is not joinable because of its immunity.352 Avoidance of
entanglement with otherwise immune sovereign property interests
and the creation of presumptions of separateness between foreign
sovereigns and private-operating instrumentalities should be
significant considerations in the development of policy on criminal
punishments in this area.
Taking these four considerations and boiling them down into
questions, policymakers should be asking: (1) what are the foreign
sovereign owned- or controlled-entities that should incur criminal
liability for crimes in the United States; (2) what is a truly private
venture and/or activity, the prosecution of which will have
minimal effects on the public affairs of other states; (3) how can
foreign affairs considerations play into immunity determinations
in a way that is sufficiently regularized and accountable to the
348 CHARLES DOYLE, Crime and Forfeiture 5, in CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-193
(2009).
349 See id. at 14-18.
350 See id at 18-19.
351 553 U.S. 851 (2008).
352 Id. at 855.
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interests of the public; and (4) how can the entanglement of
immune interests be avoided, while still implementing effective
penalties against non-immune entities in an equitable manner? As
with sovereign immunity cases, the answers to these questions will
require, at times, uncomfortable compromises between notions of
equality and justice and the preservation of the dignity-or the
authority-of sovereign entities. Despite any awkwardness that
may exist with this rationale for continued immunity,
jurisprudence and public policy still place significant weight on it,
and so it must be preserved in the form that is the least intrusive on
other constitutional values pertaining to criminal due process, at
present.
VI. Conclusion
In sum, although the FSIA is often referred to as an all-
encompassing statute for suits against foreign states and their
associated entities,3 53 Samantar teaches that courts should strictly
construe the express language of that statute and realize that new
problems related to restrictive immunity are increasingly coming
to light,354 problems which Congress was not aware of when the
FSIA was enacted and which, therefore, do not find a basis in the
FSIA's text. Thus, individual officials are left in a gray area right
at a time when their accountability under international law is
becoming a frequently litigated issue in U.S. courts."'
Policymakers should avoid any similar confusion with respect to
the FSIA's criminal jurisdiction. Whatever action is taken to
clarify this coverage, Congress should remember that the
restrictive immunity standard has become thoroughly ingrained in
public policy."'
Cases like those above will continue to arise and, as was the
case previously, the government may continue to argue that the
FSIA does not apply to criminal cases when it wishes to prosecute
353 See, e.g., Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 197
(2007) (reinforcing that the FSIA is the "sole basis" for obtaining jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts).
354 See Rutledge, supra note 237, at 597.
355 See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
356 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 451
(1987).
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an individual, agency, state-owned corporation, ship or other
entity that does not enjoy otherwise impenetrable diplomatic
immunity.' Defendants will continue to argue that they enjoy
absolute criminal immunity under the FSIA or under customary
international law. A lack of clarity in this area only results in
spotty administration of domestic criminal law, and potential
resentment of unnecessary exceptionalism afforded to foreign-
state-associated entities able to capitalize on these ambiguities in
some cases. For those reasons, there should be some concrete
action taken to clarify the application of restrictive immunity
principles to the criminal law jurisdiction of the U.S. courts.
Perhaps others will look at the smattering of cases described
above and note that criminal foreign sovereign immunity is not
enough of a problem yet, and that the status quo, however
ambiguous, is preferable to making difficult choices that threaten
to alienate other nations to some extent. That argument has force,
and perhaps any clarifying amendment or additional statute will
have to wait until a specific event shocks the political system into
action. The timing aside, as with other types of immunity, the
push away from state impunity and towards more accountability,
whether by officials or by entities associated with the state, should
and will likely continue, because, although there have been steps
backwards in terms of domestic and foreign sovereign immunity,
nearly each decade has seen some case or event that further opens
the state and its branches to suit (e.g., the FSIA, Pinochet, the ICC,
and Samantar).3 58 Provided that individuals and non-
governmental organizations continue to press for state
accountability, and that accountability becomes further ingrained
in our legal and civil culture, foreign sovereign immunity will
have to become more restrictive and less absolute. It seems
unlikely that criminal foreign sovereign immunity will be an
exception.
357 See, e.g., In re Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d 173, 180 (D.P.R. 2010).
358 See supra Parts IV and V.
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